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 Abstract 
 
 
This study is an analysis of the impact of public opinion on the foreign policy decision-
making process in Turkish-American relations. The aim of the study is to understand the 
construction and the mobilization of public opinion, and its the impact on the decision-
makers. Turkey and the United States have a long history of friendship dating back to the 
late 18th century. Public opinion has had a substantial influence on Turkish-American 
relations. There are various actors, such as lobby groups and the media, involved in the 
construction and the mobilization of public opinion in both countries. Understanding how 
they work and how they interact with each other is crucial to comprehending influence of 
public opinion on foreign policy making. In this study, three cases are analyzed to 
highlight this influence: the Cyprus Problem, the Armenian Question and the Turkish 
accession to the European Union. In looking at these cases, it is argued that in the United 
States public opinion is generally constructed and mobilized by the elites on issues in 
which a subgroup of the nation has a special interest. On the other hand, in Turkey, 
public opinion is mostly a reaction derived from the relatively more nationalistic identity 
of the Turkish public which is also shared by the policy makers. Thus, in Turkey the flow 
of public opinion to the policy makers is comparatively more direct. The analysis 
concludes that my hypothesis is correct with respect to the United States but there are 
mixed results with respect to Turkey. 
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Chapter 1: Rationale for Studying Public Opinion 
 Turkey and the United States of America have a long history of friendship dating 
back to the late 18th century. Although these two countries are geographically far away 
from each other, and have different identities, they generally have good relations with 
each other because of their common interests. Their contemporary relationship began 
with the agreement of March 12, 1947, which implemented the Truman Doctrine which is 
an economic and military aid program that aimed to provide US support to Greece and Turkey 
to prevent them falling into the Soviet sphere.12 Since that day, Turkey and the United States 
have had mainly good relations with some fluctuations. Some of these fluctuations have 
been caused by the actions of the US executive or legislature which have alienated the 
Turkish leadership and public. Examples include the infamous “Johnson Letter,” a 
telegram sent from the US President Johnson to Turkish President Inonu in 1964 asking 
Turkey in a threatening manner to stop any possible Turkish intervention into Cyprus,3 
and then recognition of the “Armenian Genocide” by the US House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs.4 
 In my thesis, I will look at the way public opinion influences foreign policy 
                                                
1 Although the relations date back further than this date, I prefer to use this starting point given 
by the official website of U.S. Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (2010) Background 
Note: Turkey. Retrieved October 1, 2010, from: 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3432.htm#relations   
2 Public Papers of the Presidents, Henry S. Truman, The Truman Doctrine March 12, 1947. 
From: http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=2189&st=&st1= retrieved on 
April 10,2011 
3 The text of the Johnson Letter is available at  http://www.cyprus-
conflict.org/materials/johnsonletter.html retrieved on April 10.2011 
4 The United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs approved House Resolution 106 
(HR106), a bill that categorized and condemned the Ottoman Empire for the Armenian 
Genocide, on October 10, 2007. In response to the decision, Turkey ordered their ambassador 
to the United States to return to Turkey for "consultations." 
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responses in Turkish-American relations. In both of these democracies, public opinion 
has had a substantial influence on the decision-making process, but there are differences 
in the way public opinion has been constructed and expressed. I will use as examples 
three cases which have generated public reactions in both countries: the Armenian 
Question to show the influence of the Armenian lobby in the United States, the Cyprus 
Problem to analyze the competition between Turkish and Greek lobby groups in the 
United States, and Turkey's accession into the European Union to observe the influence 
of different lobby groups seeking to increase or diminish US support for Turkey's 
accession bid. In all these cases, the Turkish side will also be analyzed in terms of the 
reaction of groups and the public in Turkey. The rationale I used in the selection of these 
cases is that there has been strong influence of public opinion in all three cases.  
 In traditional international relations thinking, dominated by state-centric realism, 
public opinion is not counted as one of the factors affecting foreign policy. Realism 
suggests that the most important concern of a state is survival in the anarchical order of 
international relations. For this survival, the most crucial policy area is security which is 
called “high politics” by classical realists. “High politics” should be separated from “low 
politics” which refers to non-security issues. In foreign policy analysis, however, public 
opinion has long been considered as an influence in decision making, even though 
classical realists felt that foreign policy should be left to the specially educated elite, and 
kept away from disputes of domestic politics.5  
 In the past, the “Almond-Lippmann Consensus” based on the ideas of two 
scholars Walter Lippmann and Gabriel Almond, was accepted by scholars as a broad 
                                                
5    Scott Burchill et al. (2009) Theories of International Relations, China: Palgrave Macmillan 
pp. 49-53 
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agreement on three propositions about public opinion: (1) public opinion is highly 
volatile; (2) it lacks coherence or structure; but (3) at the end of the day, it has little if any 
impact on foreign policy.6 These pessimistic ideas about public opinion in the United 
States started to change with the Vietnam War.7 During and after the war, various studies 
and surveys of public opinion about the war were made. The results of these showed that 
public opinion is not “moody” as the consensus suggests. Scholars such as Benjamin 
Page and Robert Shapiro, belonging to the “revisionist” school, challenged the consensus 
and suggested that public opinion is not volatile, but rather it tends to be stable and 
rational. Any changes are rational responses to international and domestic changes.8  
Although the Page and Shapiro approach has come to dominate foreign policy 
scholarship, both schools have strengths and weaknesses and this study draws from the 
ideas of both to show that while public opinion changes under different conditions, it 
does not change radically but stays within a predictable range. Although, today, there is 
still a debate about the limits of the influence of public opinion on foreign policy, there is 
no debate at the issue of whether public opinion has some influence on foreign policy. It 
is important to understand how it is shaped and how it flows from the public to the policy 
makers. Although sometimes the “masses” directly influence policy-makers, it is usually 
the “elite” who aggregate and articulate mass opinion. I will therefore consider both the 
role of the mass public as well as that of the “elites.” Elites are bureaucrats, writers, 
opinion leaders, lobby groups, interest groups, national groups, NGOs, and advocacy 
                                                
6   Ole R. Holsti (1992) “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-
Lippmann Consensus” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 439-466 
7 Ibid., p.445-446 
8 "Collective policy preferences of the American public are predominantly rational, in the sense 
that they are real, coherent, and that when collective policy preferences change, they do so in 
predictable ways." Benjamin I Page, Robert Y. Shapiro (1992) The Rational Public, Chicago: 
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1992 
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groups.  
 Turkey is a country located between Europe and Asia, and possessing territory on 
both continents. The Republic of Turkey was established in 1923 as a secular and 
constitutionally democratic country after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Although 
Turkey has strong historical, cultural and religious ties with the East, mostly because of 
its predominantly Muslim population, from the beginning of its establishment it aimed to 
be a part of Western world. Turkey is a strong regional power. The United States, as a 
global superpower having interests in Europe and especially in the Middle East, has 
important relations with this regional power. The United States has a very different 
identity, which is predominantly Christian.  
 The Armenian Question is a very important case showing how lobby groups can 
draw attention to a problem, and affect domestic and foreign policy-making. Armenians 
claim that in 1915, they were killed, tortured and deported from the Ottoman Empire. 
They see these actions as a deliberate and systematic attempt to destroy the Armenian 
population in the Empire, so they want the incident to be referred to as a “Genocide.” 
Meanwhile, the Turkish side claims that in 1915, the Empire was involved in World War 
I. Different nations under the weakening Empire were trying to gain their independence 
by rebellions; the Armenian population was one of them. In 1915, Armenian Volunteers 
joined the Russian Army and started to fight against the Ottoman Empire.9 The Turkish 
side claims that in the various revolts, people from many nations were being killed or 
tortured, not only Armenians but also Turks, Kurds, and Arabs. They deny that there was 
a deliberate and systematic effort to destroy the Armenian population. In this problem, the 
                                                
9   Richard G.Hovannisian (1968) “The Allies and Armenia, 1915-18” Journal of Contemporary 
History, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 145-168 
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most important issue is the use of the term “Genocide” which is a crime under 
international law with serious consequences. Turkish advocates oppose the use of the 
term saying that this term was defined and became a crime under international law after 
the United Nations Convention on the Crime and Prevention of Genocide was passed by 
the General Assembly on 10 December 1948.10 Thus, it can not apply to any incident 
which happened before this date. The Turkish public is strongly against the Armenian 
claims. In the United States, at the same time, there is a general support of the Armenians 
as an extension of the sympathy Americans feel toward all nations being wronged. 
 The Cyprus Problem is the second case chosen for analysis. Cyprus, an island 
located in the Eastern Mediterranean, has been an area of conflict from the very 
beginning of its history. Today, what is called the “Cyprus Problem” is a territorial dispute 
between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Turkey and Greece are stakeholders in this problem 
as nationally bound states. The United States has been involved in attempts to resolve the 
case. In this case, Turkish public opinion is strongly nationalistic, and it is against any 
foreign intervention in the issue. US public opinion, in this case mostly created and led by 
lobby groups, has had an effect on US decision-making on this issue.  
 Cyprus has been an important issue in US-Turkish relations since the Johnson 
Letter was sent, which is considered a diplomatic mistake by scholars such as Nasuh Uslu 
because it caused widespread criticism and demonstrations against the United States in 
Turkey.11 The Turkish government at that time did not stop the operation in order to show 
that they did not accept any intervention in their foreign policy; they let the military start 
                                                
10 Eric D. Weitz and Robert M. Hayden (2008) “Comment: On the Meaning of Genocide and 
Genocide Denial” Slavic Review, Vol. 67, No. 2, pp. 415-421 
11  Nasuh Uslu (2003) The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-
American Relations 1959-2003, New York: Nova Science Publishers. p. 24  
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the Cyprus Peace Operation. The Turkish operation led to a US military embargo on 
Turkey in 1974, strong protests in the United States against the Operation, a UN proposal 
called the Annan Plan and a referendum held in Cyprus. Among the groups leading public 
opinion in this case were advocacy groups such as The American Hellenic Institute and 
The American Turkish Council, which sought to create a favorable public opinion to gain 
US support for their positions.  
 The last case analyzed is the accession of Turkey into the European Union. 
Turkey's accession bid is an important issue in Turkish-American relations. The United 
States has supported Turkey's bid and issued several statements on this issue.12 In the 
United States, the Turkish Lobby works to maintain US support. Meanwhile, some 
advocacy groups in the United States, such as the Armenian-American Community and 
Greek Lobby are trying to reduce this support for Turkey's accession. In Turkey, public 
opinion on the issue is articulated by elites, mostly by the business elite.  
 In the rest of the thesis, I first review my research design and literature, then 
provide background on Turkish-American relations and the three cases I have selected. I 
then specifically analyze the role of public opinion in each case for each country. I 
conclude with a summary of my findings.  
 
 
 
                                                
12 S. Ozcan Laciner, and M. Ihsan Bal (2005) European Union with Turkey: the possible impact 
of Turkey’s membership on theEuropean Union, Ankara: National Agency for Strategic 
Research (USAK) pp.71-74  
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 Chapter 2: Public Opinion Research 
 The main question asked in my thesis will be “How does public opinion influence 
the decision-making processes in Turkish-American relations?” To answer this question, I 
hypothesize that public opinion has a substantial influence on foreign-policy decision-
making processes in Turkish-American relations. However, although in both Turkey and 
the United States public opinion affects decision-making, it does so in different ways. 
 In the case of Turkey, public opinion appears generally as a response to a 
phenomenon driven by values, culture and nationalism. Because this reaction derives 
from the national a nationalistic identity, its flow is often directly from public to the 
leaders who share nationalistic public values and identity, and therefore are sensitive to 
mass opinion. The elites will obviously tend to share these nationalistic values as well.  
 In the case of the United States, public opinion is the outcome of a more complex 
process. The elites are more effective in the creation of public opinion. The elites channel 
the heterogeneous values and opinions of the people to the decision-makers. By the elites, 
I mean the media, lobbies and interest groups. In my thesis, I do not include Congress 
members as elites, as some studies do, but rather as decision-makers. Because of the 
sheer size of the country and the diversity of the nations living together, it is not possible 
for the masses to influence the leadership directly except through relatively rare 
demonstrations on issues of major interest. (see Figure 2.1) 
 In order to support my hypotheses, I will analyze three cases: the Armenian 
Question, the Cyprus Problem and Turkey's accession to the European Union. However, I 
will first discuss the literature and the main debates Ibid. the role of public opinion. I will 
start by defining what public opinion is. Then, I will look at the relationship between 
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public opinion and foreign policy. In the last part of this chapter, I will look specifically at 
the actors who create and mobilize public opinion in Turkey and the United States.  
 
  
 
 Definitions and General Concepts 
 If we agree with Pierre Bourdieu that “public opinion does not exist,”13 we think 
that it is simply an illusion supported by polls and surveys which do not mean anything 
but the numbers. Or we can agree with Susan Herbst and accept public opinion as a 
“socially constructed” reality created by our shared model of democracy in contemporary 
                                                
13 George F. Bishop (2005) The Illusion of Public Opinion, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishing 
The flow of opinion 
Feedback 
Figure 2.1 Blue arrows symbolize the flow of public opinion. According to this chart, there are 
two ways for mass opinion to reach the decision makers, and influence action. The first way is 
the direct movement from mass to decision-makers. Second is the flow through the elite. Action 
can be defined broadly, from a speech of a leader to a policy change. Red arrows, on the other 
hand, symbolize feedbacks from the elite and from outside the decision-making resulted from 
the action. This feedback is influential in shaping public opinion. 
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society, and actually just a reflection of the media.14 However, the literature on foreign 
policy takes the role of public opinion seriously.  
 In the literature, although there are various views Ibid. the characteristics of 
public opinion, it is nearly impossible to find a single definition of public opinion itself. 
At a minimum public opinion can be described as the sentiment shared by a number of 
people in a country Ibid. a political or social phenomenon. Although the opinion of the 
people cannot be homogenous, the dominant attitude is generally accepted as potentially 
influential public opinion. There are various reasons for the creation of this common 
ground such as history, culture, education, influence of elites (media especially), and 
religion. 
 This definition itself creates the need for further explanations. “Attitude” has 
countless definitions, but we can simply say that it is a response to objects based on prior 
knowledge or experience of the person, the public in this situation.15 According to 
Norrander and Wicox, attitudes have three main components: (1) a cognitive element that 
links the object to the information; this may even be a wrong belief but it shows what the 
individual believes as the truth/reality; (2) an affective element that links the object to an 
evaluation or emotional reaction; this is the element which makes us angry, happy, 
relaxed Ibid. that object, and (3) a conative element that may link the object to actual 
behavior; this element mobilizes the public to take action such as sending e-mails, and 
joining protests.16 By looking at these components, we can say that any opinion without 
an action is not a part of influential public opinion. However, unmobilized public opinion 
                                                
14 Ibid., pp.2-3 
15 Barbara Norrander and Clyde Wicox (2009) Understanding Public Opinion, New York: CQ 
Press 
16 Ibid. 
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can also be important. 
 In the book, the Anatomy of Public Opinion, Jacob and Michal Shamir argue that 
public opinion is a system with four major premises. First, public opinion is a collective 
social system that mediates and accommodates social change with the knowledge of the 
very existence of others who share values, beliefs, and concerns. They emphasize that 
awareness of others and likeness of minds are crucial. Second, public opinion is a 
multidimensional phenomenon, which cannot be reduced to any single expression. With 
various different facets, public opinion is a dynamic social entity that often preserves the 
status quo but sometimes causes change. Third, they argue that public opinion always 
evolves on different dynamic paths. And finally, the nature of the information 
environment is a major factor in determining which dynamic will be set in motion.17 This 
information environment is mostly created by the elite.  
 Under the most simplistic definition, the elite is a relatively small but dominant 
group of people in a society. This small group has a privileged status, and is separated 
from the “masses” by their education, culture and influence over politics. Writers, media, 
lobby groups, and interest groups form part of elite. The rest of the public is generally 
called as the “masses.” The elite is seen as holding “opinion leadership” because of its 
education. The masses at the same time are generally seen as less educated and more 
subject to thinking emotionally. Thus there are three main groups interacting on policy 
matters: the elites, the masses and the decision-makers.  
 The general assumption follows Benjamin Page's theory of “elite-mass gaps” 
                                                
17 Jacob Shamir and Michal Shamir (2000) The Anatomy of Public Opinion, University of 
Michigan Press, pp. 2-7 
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which states that there is an intellectual gap between the elite and the masses.18 While the 
elite has knowledge and ability to create change, ordinary citizens, the masses, follow 
them because of their limited information.  
 Of all criticisms made on public opinion, perhaps Walter Lippmann was the 
harshest modern critic.19 For Lippmann and his followers, “the informed and politically 
competent citizens of traditional democratic theory simply did not exist- not because 
most people were innately incapable of understanding the world of politics and public 
affairs but rather because they just did not have the time or energy to invest in learning 
Ibid. the issues, policies, and other political matters that were remote from the practical 
concerns of their daily lives.”20 A public made up of politically informed citizens is “the 
unattainable ideal” for him. He claims that the public does not show interest in any 
subject unless it directly affects them.21 Lippmann was also against the acceptance of the 
results of surveys or polls as public opinion, because he believed that an uninformed 
public could not have a sound opinion just because it is asked to express its opinion 
often.22 Behind his criticism, Lippmann explains that his purpose is not to burden every 
citizen with expert opinions, but to push that burden away from him towards the 
responsible administrator.23  
 
                                                
18 Justin Lewis (2001) Constructing Public Opinion, New York: Colombia University Press 
19 Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro (1992) The Rational Public, Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, p. 4  
20 George F. Bishop (2005) p. 4 
21 Walter Lippmann (1927) The Phantom Public, USA; Transaction Publishers, pp.12-29 
22 Page and Shapiro (1992) pp. 4-6 
23 Walter Lippmann (1960), Public Opinion, New York: The Macmillan Company, pp.398-410 
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 Public Opinion and Foreign Policy  
 In the realist world of international relations, public opinion was in the past seen 
as an unimportant detail with limited, if any, influence on decision-makers. Traditional IR 
thinking was dominated by state-centric realism, and this realist tradition was deeply 
skeptical of the public's contribution to an effective foreign policy. Realism suggests that 
in the anarchical order of international relations, the most important concern of a state is 
survival. This survival is accepted as more important than any other concerns such as the 
well-being of the citizens. For survival, the state needs to create a balance of power with 
rivals in the anarchical international order. The classical realists considered the 
statesman's role as crucial in creating this but neo-realists did not include either the 
statesman or any domestic conditions.  
 Most realists would distinguish between foreign policy and other public policy 
issues. The public might be informed enough to deal with domestic issues that affect their 
daily lives, but foreign affairs are too remote from their interest, knowledge and 
experience, and generally they have little interest in becoming more informed Ibid. such 
complex and complex issues.24 In this separation, foreign policy is called “high politics” 
which is mainly focused on security. “High politics” should be separated from “low 
politics” which refers to domestic politics. “High" does not signify the importance only, 
but also the untouchable character of foreign policy, which should be left to the specially 
educated elite, and kept away from disputes of domestic politics.25 Ordinary citizens with 
limited knowledge were expected to deal with only the “low” areas of domestic politics. 
                                                
24 Ole R. Holsti (1992) “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-
Lippmann Consensus” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 439-466 
25 Scott Burchill et al. (2009) Theories of International Relations, China: Palgrave Macmillan, 
pp.49-53 
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This view leaves no place for public opinion in security decision-making processes.  
 For realists, public opinion is generally “an obstacle in the definition of vital 
national interests and in the implementation of appropriate foreign and defense policies to 
pursue those interests”26 because of the moral burden it brings. The only role realists 
think that public opinion can play is as a powerful force for persuasion of friends, allies, 
and interested parties.27 But here, realists do not favor public opinion “inside” the country 
but as a “insider enemy” in the other country, as a tool playing an indispensable role in 
legitimating and sustaining long-term efforts to pursue and protect vital interests. This 
can create also a fear of public opinion which is open to influences from outside.  
 Although the realists dominated the literature, there is a long, liberal-democratic 
tradition, dating back at least to Kant and Bentham. Liberals believe that governments act 
on behalf of the people. Popular preferences are taken into account in policy making. 
They also note that the inclusion of public opinion makes foreign policy more peaceful 
and stable. This idea is a part of the “democratic peace theory” which states that the 
public can play a constructive role by constraining policy makers in their decision-
making process in democratic countries. Liberals assume that people can stop wars by 
their democratic participation, and  they would because they are the ones adversely 
affected by the conditions of a war. Thus democratic countries are less likely to solve 
their conflicts by war.28 
 The longstanding debate between the realists and the liberals came to a peak in 
World War I. WWI can be counted as the first war of public relations because of the 
                                                
26 Ole R. Holsti (2004) Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, The University of 
Michigan Press  
27 Scott Burchill et al. (2009) p.50 
28  Ole R. Holsti (1992) p.440 
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efforts of both sides to influence and persuade the “world public” to believe the rightness 
of their aims. Along with war on the battlefield, there was an intense war of propaganda 
going on.  President Wilson was leading the way for liberals and repeatedly talking Ibid. 
his hope for a peaceful and democratic postwar era in which the peoples of the world 
would live happily ever after.  Wilson had a belief in democracy and the constructive 
influence of the people on decision-making. On the other hand, scholars such as Walter 
Lippmann were talking Ibid. the daily worries of the ordinary people who had no 
knowledge Ibid. and interest in foreign policy. This debate was interrupted by the rise of 
World War II, and the skeptics of public opinion increased.29 
 The end of WWII opened a new era in public opinion studies with the initiation of 
a growing number of polls and surveys seeking to understand public opinion on major 
issues of foreign policy. These surveys made by major polling institutions gained a 
reputation and increased in number in these years. Two scholars dominated the literature 
on public opinion at that time, Gabriel Almond and Walter Lippmann.  
 As noted in Chapter 1, the “Almond-Lippmann Consensus”30 was accepted as a 
broad agreement among scholars on three propositions Ibid. public opinion. The first 
proposition was that public opinion is highly volatile and thus provides inadequate and 
dubious foundations for a stable and effective foreign policy. Scholars started to believe 
that the public was neither informed nor interested in foreign affairs after many polls and 
surveys showing the public's attitude to world affairs. The attitudes of the people were 
subject to rapid and random change, which did not make sense to these scholars. The 
                                                
29  Ibid. 
30 Although Walter Lippmann and Gabriel Almond did not even live at the same period of time, 
their ideas about public opinion are called as “Almond-Lippmann Consensus” in public 
opinion literature. It is important to mention that, this consensus is a product of the WWII 
period.  
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second proposition claimed that public opinion on foreign affairs was lacking in 
coherence and structure. Almond said that “foreign policy attitudes among most 
Americans lack intellectual structure and factual content.”31 This proposition was mostly 
supported by the findings of Philip Converse. Converse found that the masses had no 
ideological structure which might provide some coherence to political thinking; all 
attitudes were subject to change in time because of their unstructured nature. Thus mass 
attitudes might be described as “non-attitudes.” Meanwhile, elite attitudes were a little 
more structured and thus, more coherent. The third proposition was that at the end of the 
day, public opinion has little if any influence on foreign policy decision-making.32 This 
“consensus” was supported by the writings of various thinkers such as Thomas A. Bailey, 
Hans J. Morgenthau and George F. Kennan who thought that if public opinion had an 
influence, it would be a barrier to thoughtful and coherent diplomacy.33  
 Until the outbreak of the Vietnam War, the consensus was dominant in the 
literature but later on, new studies of public opinion were started. One of the first of these 
studies was made by Sydney Verba who focused on American policies toward Vietnam. 
Verba and his colleagues found support for the policies of the government but also 
unearthed approval for alternative policies to end the conflict.34  
 Holsti calls this era with new findings of independent surveys as the “Renaissance 
of the interest in public opinion.”35 Various new studies challenged the consensus, one of 
the most important of these being done by Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro. In their 
                                                
31 Gabriel Almond (1960) “The instability of Mood” in Gabriel Almond (1960) The American 
People and Foreign Policy, New York: Praeger, p.69 
32 Ole R Holsti (1992) pp.441-445 
33 Ibid., p.443 
34 Ibid., p.445 
35 Ibid. 
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book, The Rational Public, Page and Shapiro claim that public opinion is not volatile as 
the consensus claims but rather it generally favors a stable and peaceful foreign policy. 
According to them, the “capricious change” is a myth, and the collective policy 
preferences of Americans are quite stable. If there is a shift taking place in attitude, it is 
not that unexpected and random; rather it is reasonable, event-driven and modest in 
magnitude.36 Page and Shapiro found that all shifts taking place were related to social, 
economic and political circumstances, so the shifts “made sense.” Actually none of the 
studies done in that period was based on any new information supporting the idea that 
public is more informed or educated; rather they analyzed the same less-informed public, 
using nearly the same questions used by the critics. They asked the same questions to the 
public repeatedly over substantial numbers of months and years, and finally they found 
out that the public has a more rational and event-driven way of thinking than previously 
thought.  
 Scholars also started to challenge Converse's findings on public attitudes which 
stated that the public does not have an ideological basis for their opinion, thus making 
their attitude less coherent. Although there was no consensus on the publics attitude, 
scholars started to claim that “poorly informed” people had a general way of thinking 
which makes their opinion coherent.37 This “way” is generally constant and it is derived 
from the culture and traditions of that nation. 
 The most difficult and also the most important question was now whether or not 
public opinion is important and influential on foreign policy.  If it is influential, there are 
new questions rising such as: “How does public opinion get to the policy-makers?” or 
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“What are the means the public uses to influence foreign policy?” As I explained above, 
public opinion was assumed to be ineffective and unimportant in the policy-making 
process until the 1960s. Even when the impact of public opinion seemed clear, scholars 
and politicians did not accept the idea that there was an independent influence of public 
opinion.38 Instead, they continued to see the public as under the total control of the elite. 
Other scholars such as Page and Shapiro supported the role of collective public opinion in 
foreign policy decision-making, contending that it is rational in the sense that “real, 
stable, differentiated, consistent, coherent; reflective of basic values and beliefs; and 
responsive (in predictable and reasonable ways) to new information and changing 
circumstances.39 In the book Vietnam and the Silent Majority, Rosenberg, Verba and 
Converse claim that public opinion is very important, and in the mass democracies of 
today, elections are very important in the transaction of public opinion to the policy-
makers.40  
 There are various efforts but not yet a single convincing study on the public-
policy relationship. Actually the hardest part is to build causality between opinion and 
action. Page talks Ibid. this problem: “When opinion and policy correspond, it is 
extremely difficult to sort out whether public opinion has influenced policy, or policy has 
influenced opinion, or there has been some mixture of reciprocal processes; or, indeed, 
whether an outside factor, by affecting both, has produced a spurious relationship.” 41  
 Various scholars used various different techniques to find out this causal 
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relationship between public opinion and policy making. In the 1960s, the creative 
research by Miller and Stokes on representation in Congress proved inconclusive because 
of causal ambiguity. Miller and Stokes simply could not be sure whether constituents 
were influencing members of Congress or vice versa.42Bob Erikson, in 1978, made a very 
significant study by using demographic data on congressional districts to simulate 
constituency policy preferences, and at the end, Erikson found a large influence of 
opinion on policy.43 The technique Erikson used lessened the possibility that reciprocal 
influences from policy to opinion were exceeding the estimates of opinion's impact. But 
there was a problem because of redistricting: members of Congress may affect the 
demography of their districts over the years. Also, the use of demographic variables can 
be vulnerable to false results: third parties such as religious organizations, agricultural 
and industrial corporations associated with district demography, can influence policy 
directly. It can create a false appearance that demography operates through opinion to 
affect policy.44 
 In these years, Achen, Jackson and others were also trying to show that 
corrections for measurement error in surveyed policy preferences from the very small 
congressional district samples also led to much larger estimates of the effects of opinion 
on policy.45 But all those methods and techniques had their own problems in proving a 
causal relationship between public opinion and policy-making. One of the most ambitious 
studies made by Page and Shapiro in 1983 used a mixed cross-sectional and time-series 
                                                
42 Ibid. 
43 Robert S. Erikson (1978) “Constituency Opinion and Congressional Behavior: A 
Reexamination of the Miller-Stokes Representation Data” American Journal of Political 
Science 22:511-35. 
44 Benjamin Page (1994) pp. 27-29 
45 Ibid. 
 22 
design. They found that changes in collective opinion were, Ibid. two-thirds of the time, 
followed by parallel policy changes within a year or so. Although Page and Shapiro were 
proud of their study, they also encountered some problems in technique. They could not 
be sure Ibid. the order of the influence because policy may have moved before opinion, 
and probably influenced it, in nearly half the cases. Also, Page and Shapiro did not count 
other factors affecting opinion and policy change, such as world events, activities of the 
elite (especially media and interest groups), and other affective factors.46  
 Although it is a complex process to set the causality between public opinion and 
policy-making, it is not possible to ignore the influence of public opinion on policy-
makers. I think instead of just qualitative research, quantitative methods should also be 
used to understand the ties between opinion and policy. A nation's identity, the 
relationship between policy-makers and the masses, the political and sociological culture 
of that country, and also the general conjecture of the world politics are all important to 
analyze the influence of public opinion on the policy-making.  
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Chapter 3: Creation and Mobilization of Public Opinion in the 
United States and Turkey 
 In this chapter, first, I will be looking at the creation of public opinion in Turkey 
and the United States, which have different historical, political, social and cultural 
backgrounds. Then, I will look at the flow of public opinion in these countries. But before 
I analyze these countries, I will look at public opinion creation in general and at its ties to 
national identity.  
 As noted in Chapter 2, public opinion is the sentiment shared by a number of 
people in a country about a political or social phenomenon. People from various 
backgrounds share similar opinions, and form a response. There are many factors that 
create this commonality such as history, culture, education, and religion. These factors 
and many others build a national identity. National identity is one of the most important 
determinants of the reactions people have that is it contributes in the constitution of 
public opinion.  
 There is a strong correlation between national identity and the policy preferences 
of the people. According to Deborah J. Schildkraut, “national identity is an abstract 
symbolic attachment and demonstrates that abstract symbolic attachments are often 
strong predictors of policy preferences. These attachments are a mechanism through 
which people determine what they want, what is possible, what to fear, and who they 
are.”47 In other words, identity creates a basis for public opinion by determining what 
people value, what they want, and how they want to live. This identity base, before any 
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information is known about a phenomenon, creates an attitude towards it. History, 
traditions and the political culture of a country are very important in the determination of 
this attitude.  
 There are also other factors that are effective in the creation of public opinion 
such as the role of the elite. The media, lobbies and interest groups are the main elite 
actors. According to Page, the media can be counted as a political actor which can 
directly influence decision making by working as an interest group, or it can indirectly 
affect the policy-makers by using publications or broadcasts to influence and change the 
beliefs and policy preferences of both mass and other elite audiences. This indirect way 
of affecting policy making might be especially attractive to the media organizations 
because of their special positions as the key carriers of political information.48 Here, Page 
assumes that the media can be a political actor if it works purposively and in a unified 
way to influence policy change. On the other hand, the media can also have a role as a 
carrier of the opinion of the masses to the elite and the decision-makers. 
 Lobby groups are also important actors in the creation of public opinion. 
Especially in a large country with a diverse population like the United States, lobby 
groups play a significant role in attracting the attention of the policy-makers to a subject. 
These lobby groups are sometimes national or ethnic groups in a country working for the 
well-being of their nationals in that country and in their home country. They generally 
represent the minorities and their interests.  
 Lobby groups might be counted as interest groups, but the two can also be 
distinguished from each other. “Interest groups,” are advocacy groups defending special 
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interest organizations such as national or international corporations or business groups. 
Kenneth T. Andrews and Bob Edwards define advocacy organizations as groups that 
“make public interest claims either promoting or resisting social change that, if 
implemented, would conflict with the social, cultural, political, or economic interests or 
values of other constituencies and groups.”49 These engage in have a five-step process in 
influencing policy-making processes: (1) agenda setting; (2) access to decision-making 
arenas; (3) achieving favorable policies; (4) monitoring and shaping implementation, and 
(5) shifting the long-term priorities and resources of political institutions.50 These groups 
are specifically important because they have direct communication with the groups they 
are defending. Lobby groups are generally financed and supported by people wanting to 
raise their own voice. In the cases I will be analyzing, it will be clearer how they work 
and how they influence the public and policy-making processes. Lobbyists working in 
these organizations are generally highly educated and interested in the issues they defend 
or oppose.  
Business groups want to have an influence over policy making in most countries. 
Interest groups can have influence directly or indirectly over the decision-makers. 
Directly, they can lobby and join campaigns, support political actors and make demands 
on them. On the other hand, because they are the part of the elite, they can try to 
influence mass opinion and create a reaction to a case.  
 There are two ways for public opinion to reach decision-makers, directly from the 
masses to the policy-makers, or through the elite. Direct reach can occur in two different 
ways. First, it can happen naturally through the shared identity of the masses and elite 
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with the policy-makers. This way of flowing can be seen in smaller and less diverse 
countries like Turkey. Second, the masses can reach the policy-makers through large 
demontrations. This is less likely to occur in both countries studied in my thesis. The 
reasons differ in each country. In Turkey, civil society is not strong and because of the use 
of force by the police, people hesitate to go to demonstrations. In the United States, on 
the other hand, only major policy changes can unite the diverse population. 
 Opinions can also flow through the elite. It is important to recall that the elite is 
also a part of the public, and they might have their own separate opinions from the 
masses. The elite, can play a significant role in the articulation of the opinions of the 
masses to the decision-makers. In this transference, lobby groups are particularly 
important because they have direct communication with the people whose voice they try 
to raise. The media is also an important actor. The role of the media as the voice of the 
people is generally underestimated because it is generally seen as an actor that shapes 
opinion in its own desired direction. But, especially with the developing technology, there 
are many new media tools through which people can express their opinions. New social 
media tools using the Internet are becoming more and more effective, and in the near 
future, it is expected that the use of social media will reach and pass the use of the 
conventional media sources such as newspapers, radio or television.   
  
 The United States 
 In this section, I will be looking at the creation and transference of public opinion 
in the United States. To understand this creation process, I will look at the American 
identity, and the relationship between the elite, the masses and the policy-makers in the 
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United States. 
 There is a growing interest in studying American identity. According to 
Schildkraut, this trend is driven by  “(1) real and dramatic changes in the ethnic makeup 
of the U.S. Population, (2) the mid-1990s surge in nativist sentiment and legislation, and 
(3) the maturation and normalization of the rights revolutions that started in the 1960s.”51 
Stanley Renshon claims that we are in a new era in identity politics and it is the second 
big challenge American identity has faced after the Civil War.52 But unlike the Civil War, 
this time the danger lies in conflicts between races, heritages, religions and cultures. But 
in the end, Renshon concludes, American national culture has, overall, been "decoupled 
from ethnicity, separated from religion, and detached even from race."53  
 Traditionally, American identity has been defined by white Protestantism rooted 
in Northern European heritage and ancestry.54 This ethnoculturalism has been criticized 
widely but still it is powerful enough to shape what people, even the non-white people 
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living in the United States, think of as an “American.” 55 Yet, although this definition still 
has influence, it is obvious that it is not valid and helpful in truly understanding American 
identity today.  
 Incorporationism is a way of thinking about American identity based on the 
immigrant legacy and cultural diversity. It does not focus on the similarities between 
different religious, racial or ethnic groups, but it emphasizes the differences and 
celebrates all cultural diversities.56 It is a very difficult but rich position for a country 
because what is meant here is not a melting pot, but a heterogeneous togetherness under 
law. There are many opponents of this idea of identity. Renshon believes that immigrants 
should be assimilated in order to keep the traditional American values, and he claims that 
in the end it is better for the immigrants because they came to the United States for these 
values.57 
 In a public opinion survey done by James Davis, Tom Smith and Peter Marsden in 
2004, people were asked about the characteristics of being “truly American.” According 
to the results of the survey, a true American should be born in the United States, English 
speaking and Christian. But more than half of the people also emphasized respect for 
American political institutions and laws.58  
 
According to the same survey, more than half of the population is in favor of 
assimilation policies in order to have a better community: This was gleaned from answers 
to the following question, “Some people say that it is better for a country if different 
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racial and ethnic groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions. Others say that it 
is better if these groups adapt and blend into the larger society. Which of these views 
comes closer to your own?”59 
 According to Census2010 data (Table 3.1),60 nearly 65 percent of the American 
population is white alone, and around 80 million people are non-white. This number is 
more than many countries' populations in the world. It is important to say that “white” is 
not a homogenous group. There are various different races, religions and origins in the 
white group. Chart 3.1 shows the religious diversity of the United States.61 By looking at 
these data, we can see that there are various groups of people living in the United States, 
and it is natural that they will be sensitive to the issues concerning their origin or religion.  
 
 Other than origin or religion, there are also many other factors affecting the 
American identity such as the culture and traditions created by people living together 
under US laws. According to the study of Davis, Smith and Marsden, the great majority 
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of the population feel themselves American, and they are proud to be American citizens. 
Again, more than half of the people think America is a better country than any other 
country in the world. When they are asked about the areas they are proud of, more than 
half answered history, the way democracy works, economic achievements, the armed 
forces, political influence in the world, technological achievements, and achievements in 
art, sports and literature.62 These areas are creating commonalities between the various 
groups living together, thus building a common identity. Again in the same survey, more 
than half of the American citizens thought that America is and should be influential in 
world politics.63 At the same time, in the same survey, there was opposition to 
international organizations and their involvement in American foreign policy. More than 
half of the population favors the idea that America should not follow the decisions of 
international organizations but also not ignore them totally.64  
 These data sets provide us with a basic idea about the national characteristics of 
American people. The American people support American involvement in world politics, 
and its role as a leader in world politics. They are not in favor of following the 
international organizations' decisions in foreign policy but they are not completely 
against the organizations. This outcome can create a framework for public opinion 
preferences. We can say that the American people support government leadership in 
world politics, and they may push government to take action by their expectations.  
 The media play a very important role in shaping American public opinion because 
it is highly followed by the masses. Although the press is also highly influential over the 
masses, TV has a special position in American way of life. There is even an ironic 
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nickname, “TV Nation”, used for the American nation. 65  According to Patrick 
O'Heffernan, the mass media play distinct roles in shaping American foreign policy by 
being a source of rapid information about policy decisions, an agenda setter for US 
citizens, a proxy for diplomats, and a tool used by non-governmental organizations even 
by terrorists.66  
 The media influence on public opinion and foreign policy has been called by the 
name “CNN Effect” for years. The CNN effect is a term which originated in the 1991 
Gulf War, and it refers to the ubiquity of the news channel that ensured all sides had the 
same information at the same time.67 Starting from that time, this phrase became “the 
generic term for the ability of real-time communications technology, via the news media, 
to provoke major responses from domestic audiences and political elites to both global 
and national events.”68 Just after the Cold War, while Americans were celebrating their 
victory, there was hope in the world about the “new world order” in which all the citizens 
of the world would be protected everywhere by the great community of the world. In 
those days, the Gulf War started as a response to the Kuwait invasion of Iraq. In that war, 
CNN was broadcasting 24/7 from Iraq, and carrying stories of the casualties to the homes 
of the people. Americans were watching the bloody operations of the US Army and they 
started to react. Later on this effect became visible in other humanitarian interventions of 
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the West such as Somalia, Haiti and former Yugoslavia.69 Since then, TV has played an 
important role in American politics: in a survey done in 2001, just after the 9/11, 81 
percent of the surveyed Americans said that TV is their main source of information and 
news, because it is easier to follow and more convenient because of videos and images 
used as proof.70 
 Scholars such as Wright Mills think that Americans are isolated individuals who 
receive information and opinion from the mass media.71 The members of the press, 
especially columnists, are also important opinion leaders but not as much as television 
newspersons and commentators. Still, writers are respected intellectuals and they play an 
important role in building mass and elite opinion -the public opinion. The headlines and 
the news selected are important tools in setting the agenda. Newspapers can influence the 
agenda of the public and create favorable public opinion in the direction they wish. V.S. 
Yarros emphasizes this influence by saying that “The newspapers make and mar political 
fortunes. They ‘create’ great men out of next to nothing and destroy the reputations of 
men truly fit for leadership. They decide questions of war and peace. They carry 
elections. They overawe and coerce politicians, rulers, and courts. When they are 
virtually unanimous nothing can withstand them.”72  
 Lobby and interest groups are also very influential in public opinion creation. 
There are various interest groups working to influence American politics. According to a 
study done by Washington State University, there are more than four hundred advocacy 
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groups and 17.000 lobbyists working on different issues in the United States.73 In sum, 
the flow of public opinion from the mass to the decision-makers is a complex process in 
the United States. The United States has a diverse population in which there are various 
ethnic and religious groups. It is not possible for the general public to be informed and 
interested in every subject that different groups are concerned about. Thus, there is a 
strong elite leadership, which articulates mass opinion to the decision-makers.  
 
 Turkey  
Turkey, or the Turkish Republic, is a young country with a very old heritage. It 
was established in 1923 after a national independence war between 1919-1922. It is a 
national republic with a mostly Turkish and Muslim population. According to a survey on 
ethnical origin, 76 percent of the population is Turkish. Actually, ethnic identity is a 
problematic issue for Turkey. State nationalism does not accept any ethnic origins of 
people except Turkish. In the Article 66 of the Turkish Constitution, the tie between 
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citizenship and ethnicity is defined by saying that “everyone bound to the Turkish state 
through the bond of citizenship is a Turk.”74 Even though the state does not recognize any 
other ethnic identity, there are various ethnicities in the population (Chart 3.2).75 The 
debate about who is a Turk continues today, “following on the late Ottoman contestation 
of subjecthood around secular Ottomanism, Turkism, or Islamism. The choice of ‘Turk’ 
or Turkish as the stamp of identity, seized on by Ataturk, served as an apt icon of the 
young republic.”76  This identity has been challenged by many identities but most 
importantly, in the last decades, Kurds have emerged to challenge the idea of Turkishness 
as a republican identity. Even though the state try to show being Turkish as an upper 
identity, 45 percent of the population thinks that a true “Turk” should be “Turkish” 
originally (see Chart 3.3).77  
 Turkey is a secular country so there is no official religion of the state, but a large 
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majority of Turkey is Muslim (Chart 3.4).78 Although Islam is not the state's religion, it is 
automatically written “Muslim” on every Turkish state id, unless they have a proof of 
another religion to change it. In Turkey, there are different sects are Islam believed by 
people, but the dominant sect is Sunni Hanefi by more than 80 percent of population (See 
Table 3.2).79 
 These data sets show us a country with a more homogenous identity than we see 
in the United States. Actually, looking at these data sets does not help us to understand 
Turkish identity. In Turkey, Turkish Islam is tied up with Turkish nationalism in a unique 
fashion derived from the secular nationalism of the Turkish state.80 Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk, the “founder of the Turkish Republic,” left a state with a Western constitution 
and secular institutions. Today secular nationalism is known as Kemalism. “Although the 
Kemalist state had purged Islam from the state and left it to society, it did not allow Islam 
to have an autonomous life in the hands of social actors. Instead, the Turkish state opted 
to ‘étatize’ Islam, and built the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet Isleri 
Baskanligi).”81 The reason for this institution was to protect secularism in a mostly 
Muslim population. Kemalist state elites and the army have a special position “guarding” 
the secular democratic structure of Turkey. In the end, Turkey has an exceptional position 
in the Islamic world with its secularism and western state system.82  
 Turkey has a very unique identity, which can be defined as “in the middle of the 
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west and the east.” Although nearly all of its population is Muslim, Turkey is a country 
with strong ties with Christian Europe, and it has a claim to Europe's cultural identity that 
reaches back more than 2,000 years mostly because of its geography. Turkey's 
involvement in European affairs was inherited from the Ottoman Empire. This tradition 
of deep involvement in European affairs illustrates the way in which Turkey, while never 
quite being seen as a component of Europe's cultural family, always played the role of a 
European power.83 At the same time, Turkey's relations with the Islamic world have 
always been problematic starting from the declaration of the secular republic and 
continuing with Turkey's involvement in western organizations such as NATO and the 
Council of Europe.84 
 If we look at the construction of public opinion in Turkey, we see that public 
reaction does not generally occur as an intellectual response. It generally appears as a 
“natural” extension of nationalism and the highly statist culture of Turkish people. 
National and religious problems, without a prior intellectual knowledge, can create public 
reaction. This reaction generally can be “felt” by politicians and decision-makers before 
any kind of protests erupt because of the homogenous structure of the society as I 
indicated above.  
 The media and the elites are less effective in Turkey than in the United States. The 
most important reason for the difference in media influence is the fact that the Turkish do 
not benefit from it as much as the American people. TV is, as in the United States, the 
most followed media instrument in Turkey. In a survey by Konda in 2008, it was found 
that 66 percent of the adult population read newspapers. In the same survey, it was found 
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that 69.8 percent of the population does not read books.85  
 Turkish civil society is the most developed among all the Muslim states of the 
Middle East and their numbers are growing.86 But, it is not possible to say that civil 
society is powerful enough to pressure policy makers. The flow of public opinion is 
normally very direct: from public to the decision-makers. But this direct flow does not 
mean that public opinion is very powerful in every aspect of decision-making. Actually in 
domestic policy decisions such as decisions on the minimum wage, public health, or 
military operations public opinion has a really limited influence. But on issues that 
provoke nationalism, public opinion can have a strong influence over domestic policy. In 
Turkish culture, sovereignty of the state is very important. So any sign of foreign 
intervention may cause public reactions.  
 Although public opinion generally is constructed “naturally” as I indicated above, 
there is still room for elite influence The position of elites in Turkey should be 
understood before the elites are accepted as actors in the creation of public opinion. As 
inherited from the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish elite was generally a small group of 
well-educated people with western values. But although there are similarities, there are 
also differences between the elites in the Ottoman Empire and the elites of the Turkish 
Republic. Kemalist elites of the modern republic saw the establishment of the republic as 
a radical break from the past and did not accept any ties with the Ottoman heritage.87  
 The elites are “state-elites” because traditionally the elites were involved in 
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administration and politics. They have not necessarily been the rich but rather the 
educated and politically powerful. There is a large gap between state-elites and the 
general public. The elites’ western, modern and less-religious life is different from the 
general public's eastern and religious life style. The elites have been the reformist and the 
revolutionist groups of the society. They have been the “suppliers” of the rights, so they 
feel they have the right to draw the limits of these rights. This elite has had strong ties 
with the military, which is counted as the founder and the defender of the modern and 
secular Turkish Republic. Thus, the elites in Turkey have not play an effective role in the 
transference of the opinion to the policy leaders.  
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Chapter 4: History of the US-Turkey Relations  
 Starting from the early 1920s, Turks and Americans have had good relations. The 
newly established government of the Turkish Republic, in Ankara, was less suspicious 
about the United States than other western powers such as Britain and France because the 
United States was not a traditional enemy of the Ottomans. The relationship between the 
Turkish and American elites was also warm. American elites such as Admiral Mark 
Bristol and Julian Gillespie, who were American officers at that time, gained the respect 
and friendship of the Ankara circles. Similarly, representatives of the new Turkish 
government, especially Munir Ertegun, the Turkish ambassador in Washington, were 
welcomed in Washington Ertegun had established himself in President Roosevelt's 
circle.88  
 A sharp change in the Turkish-American relationship started when the Soviet 
Union tried to dominate its neighbors and extend its power. This change was what 
brought Turkey and the United States into an alliance.89 The alliance came into existence 
with the Truman Doctrine, a policy of the United States to support Greece and Turkey 
with economic and military aid to prevent their falling into the Soviet sphere in 1947, and 
this alliance was formalized with Turkey's entry into the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) in 1952 as a country in the Western bloc.90  
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The Turkish-American Alliance 
 According to scholars such as Ian O. Lesser, the United States and Turkey are not 
natural allies. The countries are divided by distance, culture, and the natural differences 
in perspective between a global and a regional power.91 In the previous chapter, I have 
also argued that there are identity differences between the United States and Turkey. So, 
what makes these two geographically remote and identically distinct states ally? To 
answer this question, I will look back to the years when this alliance was first established, 
and review the literature on alliances.  
 Turkey and the United States had different reasons for initiating an alliance in the 
beginning. According to Nasuh Uslu, Turkey aimed to protect its security, to obtain 
military and economic aid, and to strengthen its Western style state structure. The United 
States, meanwhile, wanted to become allies with Turkey because of its strategic 
importance for US interests in the Middle East and because of its global policy of 
containing the Soviet Union.  
 A common external threat to the security of states is one of the primary sources of 
alliances. In particular a weak state under threat seeks an alliance with a powerful state, 
more powerful than the threatening state, to maintain its security. In the meantime, the 
powerful state also benefits from making an alliance with a weak state by preventing its 
adversary from gaining resources and advancing its influence.92 In this case, the common 
external threat was the Soviet Union. Russians have always been seen an potential threat 
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for the Turks since the rivalry began between the Ottomans and the Russians.93 This 
rivalry turned into a serious threat when the Soviet Union abolished the Treaty of 
Friendship of 1925, sought the revision of the Montreaux Convention of 1936 on the 
Turkish Straits to the advantage of the Black Sea countries, and made some territorial 
demands in eastern Anatolia.94 Turkey immediately began to seek the military and 
diplomatic support of the United States, and became willing to pay any expense to secure 
its involvement in the Western alliance, a counter force against the Soviet Union.95 From 
the security perspective, Turkey was an important part of the American global policy of 
containing Soviet expansion, so the United States decided to extend its military and 
economic aid to Turkey to block Soviet influence or aggression.96  
 Economic and military needs can also be a factor forcing a weak state to seek an 
alliance with a more powerful state. Turkey's need for military and economic assistance 
and America's positive response to it played an important role in the formation of the 
Turkish-American alliance.97 
 There are also strategic reasons for this alliance. Ole Holsti et al. claim that when 
a weaker country needs an alliance with a great power, it often prefers a geographically 
remoter one.98 However, this alliance with a distant power can be less reliable because it 
might be difficult to agree on a common reaction to regional or local conflicts, or distance 
can cause a less certain military commitment in case of attack; the weak state may be 
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stuck in the period between an attack and the arrival of aid.99 Turkey had a very long 
frontier with the Soviet Union, and it was in the zone of Soviet natural influence and 
expansion. While it is geographically so close to the Soviet Union, the reason Turkey 
wanted to continue its alliance with the United States was not only the distance between 
them but also the belief of the Turkish policy-makers that the United States was the only 
country that could balance the Soviets. 100 
 Scholars such as William C. Olson and Ole R. Holsti, consider a common or 
similar ideology to be of secondary importance in making an alliance, after important 
security needs.101 Although ideology is not one of the primary reasons for making 
alliances, alliances established by countries which have similar, ideological and cultural 
values are more durable and effective, and they generate more cooperation and fewer 
problems.102 Turkish politicians and state elites have always claimed that Turkey is a 
democratic and secular state sharing common values and culture with the Western 
world.103 Turkish scholars, such as Faruk Logoglu, think that the relationship between 
Turkey and the United States rests on a solid foundation in terms of common values and 
shared ideals. According to Logoglu: “Commitment to and respect for democracy, the 
rule of law, human rights and freedom, economic prosperity, and national security bind 
the two nations strongly together. Both are dynamic societies that seek their golden age 
not in the past, but in the future.” 104  According to Logoglu, it is these shared values and 
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attitudes that have kept the two countries close together, enabling the relationship to 
withstand the vicissitudes and tests of time.105 Clearly, Turkey assigned more importance 
to the ideological dimension and expected its alliance with the United States to help it 
maintain better relations with the West and to pursue westernization policies at home. The 
United States, however, was more interested in US national interests than ideological 
similarity. 
 States, especially weaker ones, may also enter into alliances in order to ensure 
domestic stability and to cover up failures in their domestic politics. Obtaining the 
political, economic and military support of a powerful state such as the United States 
and/or internationally respected alliance such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), strengthens the position of the government and increases its prestige in the eyes 
of the national and international public. Especially for Turkey, this aspect of the alliance 
was very important because Turkish policy-makers saw their alliance with the West as an 
assurance of Turkey's political and democratic process as a “civilized” part of the Western 
world.106 
 From the Turkish perspective, their alliance with the United States was a result of 
their long-pursued efforts at Westernization and they attributed a great importance to 
becoming an important member of the Western world. Thus, this approach led them to be 
very anxious to fulfill the requirements of this alliance without hesitation and to show 
their loyalty to the alliance.107 
 The United States had a more realist perspective than the Turkish side. For them, 
this alliance meant the protection of mutual economic and military interests rather than 
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ideological closeness. In the US perspective, both sides had to make sacrifices in order to 
get some gains because a classic alliance relationship between two states, aims at 
maximizing gains. Although they had a more realist point of view, US policy makers 
repeatedly emphasized the importance of having similar ideological principles as two 
democratic states.108 
  
  Historical Background 
 In the 1940s, foreign policy was the preserve of the elites in both the United 
States and Turkey. In the United States, Congress followed the president without serious 
conflict. The only opponents were the isolationist members of the Congress who 
questioned the importance of Turkey for the United States. In Turkey, the prime minister 
made foreign policy with only a small number of advisers.109 Leftist groups were against 
any alliance with the United States, supporting instead an alliance with the Soviet Union. 
 In the first years, the military aspect of the alliance was the key aspect although 
Turkey was also seen as a model country in terms of the westernization of the Middle 
East. The differences in religion were not major considerations in the two countries. 
According to George Harris, the secular structure of the Turkish Republic dimmed the 
consciousness of the religious differences with the West for the Turkish elite. Harris 
continues: “The religiosity of the populace at large in Turkey had little effect on policy, 
and the outward display of the religion was discouraged in the urban centers, so that even 
members of the Turkish elite, as well as Western observers, were likely unaware of its 
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continuing power.”110  
 Actually the main focus was on Turkey's geography and its joining the NATO 
which is by the very name a regional organization. However, Turkey's accession into 
NATO in 1952 was a very important step in Turkish-American relations. The Turkish 
government paid the price of entry by sending soldiers to the Korean War. The 
government in Ankara saw NATO as an extension of the United States so they saw the 
acceptance into NATO as a sure sign of their strong friendship with the United States and 
their acceptance into the Western world.111  
 The military and economic aid coming from the United States to Turkey fed a 
belief by Turkish elites that Turkish and American interests were entirely harmonious. 
According to Harris, until the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the relationship between 
these two countries was like a happy honeymoon. The Cuban Missile Crisis was a 
confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States started by the Soviet 
building a number of nuclear missiles in Cuba. As a response to the Soviet Union, the US 
government started to use as an object of negotiations the nuclear missiles, which had 
been deployed on Turkish territory with the ability to strike Moscow.112 Turkey became a 
target for a Soviet nuclear attack because of the American bases and nuclear weapons on 
its territory and this situation raised questions about the alliance in Turkey.113 The turning 
point in the relations between Turkey and the United States was the Johnson Letter. In 
1964, President Johnson sent a telegram which is considered to be one of the harshest 
communications ever sent to an ally by the United States. The telegram delivered a 
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message warning Turkey not to engage in military operations to protect Turkish Cypriots 
who needed help in the midst of an ethnic conflict. This letter ended Turkey’s 
unquestioning good feelings towards the United States and made the United States 
suspect in the eyes of the Turkish public.114 The early signs of détente, the remission of 
the strained relations between the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1970s, was 
another sign of the weakening alliance between Turkey and the United States, because in 
this period, the perception of an external threat which was underlying the alliance, 
disappeared for a short time.115 
 In the 1970s, Turkey was dealing with the problems of domestic politics but there 
were still expectations that the alliance would provide continuous aid. Instead of lobbying 
for their interests, the Turkish leadership had weak representation in Washington. Prime 
Minister Bulent Ecevit explained this situation by saying: “We do not think it would be 
appropriate to carry out lobbying activities in the United States.”116 
 After the Johnson Letter, the alliance, especially the military component of the 
alliance, loosened significantly. Turkey was no longer an unquestioning supporter of US 
interests. Actually the Letter damaged the belief in US impartiality on the Cyprus issue. 
In 1967, when Turkish Cypriots were again in need of help because of Greek Cypriot 
attacks, the Turkish government started to consider non-cooperation with the United 
States, but the US presidential envoy Cyrus Vance found a settlement which was 
acceptable to Turkey.117 The Cyprus Peace Operation (internationally called the Turkish 
Invasion in Cyprus) started in July 1974 after Turkish politicians had lost their belief in 
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US support and decided to disregard the strong US urgings. The US Congress responded 
to this operation by imposing an arms embargo which damaged the military cooperation 
between two states and left a legacy of suspicion of American impartiality and friendship 
among Turkish politicians and the public. In the post-Cyprus period, Turkey and the 
United States entered a new, less-cooperative era of cooperation in which Turkey was no 
longer willing to say “yes” to American requests without serious negotiations.118  
 Opium poppy cultivation was another problematic issue between the United 
States and Turkey. The United States wanted Turkey to stop opium cultivation. The end 
of cultivation came only after a military coup had occurred and a military government 
had come to power.119 The pro-US decisions of the military government headed by Nihat 
Erim led the Turkish public to believe that the United States had a role in this military 
move.120 
 Starting from the 1960s, the alliance was increasingly questioned by domestic 
pressure groups in both countries. In Turkey, the Turkish press, opposition parties and 
public, specifically university students, became more and more suspicious about US 
interests in the alliance. A commonly believed conspiracy theory was that the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) was attempting to subvert Turkey. This fostered anti-
Americanism. On the other hand, in the United States, the early signs of détente made the 
rationale for foreign aid questionable. The Greek Lobby’s rising power in the Congress 
became visible when the Congress stipulated that military aid to Greece and Turkey must 
be extended at a 7:10(Greece: Turkey) ratio. The Armenian Lobby was also an effective 
actor in Turkish-American relations by agitating the United States against Turkish 
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interests. Although these domestic groups added some bitterness to the alliance, the 
governments of both countries were successful in protecting the alliance.121 
 The end of the Cold War changed dramatically the international and domestic 
context of Turkish-American relations in the 1990s. The reason for the alliance, the 
common enemy the Soviet Union was gone, and now, Turkey had to find a new reason to 
keep its strategic importance if it wanted to keep the United States as an ally. It was a 
hard situation for Turkey because in domestic politics, Turks were dealing with political 
instability and terrorism. In the United States, the Greek and the Armenian Lobbies found 
greater room for action to influence the Congress. Although significant challenges 
affected the alliance, the bilateral relationship between the United States and Turkey 
remained strong because of the domination of the Middle East agenda. In the end, the US 
government accepted Turkey as having a unique geostrategic position in the middle of 
continents and waterways. 122  
 In the first years after the Cold War, the Turkish president Turgut Ozal and 
Turkish elites tried to find new ways to sell the importance of Turkey to keep the alliance 
powerful. Ozal first tried to portray Turkey as a gateway to the former Soviet Central 
Asian and Caucasian republics but this strategy was ineffective because neither the 
United States nor the Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union accepted Turkey's role 
in the region. The new strategy appeared with the Gulf War as Ozal sought to take 
advantage of Turkey's strategic position on the margins of the Middle East. Although 
many politicians and the military opposed cooperation with the United States against the 
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trade partners in the Middle East, Ozal's willingness to strengthen the alliance won the 
discussion. In exchange for additional economic and military aid, Ozal made sure that the 
Incirlik airbase was available for allied operations in Iraq. 123  
 The Balkans were the second major area of cooperation between Turkey and the 
United States in the post-Cold War period. Ethnic conflicts following the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia were threatening regional stability and increasing the risk of a wider war in 
the region. Turkey, to protect Bosnia's Muslim community, began to engage in activist 
diplomacy to gain Western states' support to prevent the conflicts.  At the beginning, the 
United States was not willing to become involved in the Balkans but the Clinton 
administration later took the initiative to restore peace in the region. Turkey, with US 
support, joined the NATO Enforcement/Stability Force to enforce the provisions of the 
1995 Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia, and was involved in an “equip-and-train” 
program with the United States for a new military force of Bosnian Muslims.124  
 There were also issues on which Turkey and the United States had divergent 
views. The Kurdish issue was the most crucial issue creating tension between these 
states.125 The Turkish public, elites and even the military were in fear of US support to 
the Kurdish separatists in Turkey.126 The security issues in the Caucasus region could also 
be problematic between Turkey and the United States. The United States did not share 
Turkey's fears and concerns about Russian ambitions to be powerful again in the region 
but later on, the United States modified its policy in the wake of the Chechnya conflict. 
US support for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project and “east-west energy corridor” 
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signified this policy change. The support that the Armenian and Greek lobbies gained in 
the United States was another problematic issue between Turkey and the United States. 
The United States supported all peaceful communications between Turkey and Greece 
and it showed its supportiveness in the Imia/Kardak crisis, a territorial dispute about a 
small island in Aegean Sea, in 1995.127 
 The United States has been a firm supporter of Turkish accession to the European 
Union (EU) since the beginning of the long and tiring quest for entry. Especially after the 
Cold War, this supportive attitude of the United States became more and more important 
for Turkey as a reminder of its strategic importance to the West. Especially during the 
1990s, the United States lobbied extensively on Turkey's behalf with the EU officials and 
these lobbying activities played a significant role in the signing of a customs treaty in 
1995 between Turkey and the EU.128 
 In November 1999, President Clinton spoke to the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly, and formally announced the existence of a “strategic partnership” between the 
United States and Turkey in saying that “in the post-Cold War era, our partnership has 
become even more important than before.”129 It was accepted as a clear sign from 
Washington that Turkey still held high importance in terms of US strategic objectives in 
the region and shared common broad political and military goals in the region with 
Turkey.130 
 According to Frances G. Burwell, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 
created expectations that Turkey would regain the former importance it had had in the 
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Cold War period. But the United States decision to invade Iraq set back the realization of 
those hopes because the possibility of war was viewed with alarm in Turkey, and the 
Turkish parliament rejected the United States request to open a second front in March 
2003 because of large-scale protests by the public.131  
 The Iraq War increased Turkish fears of instability in the Middle East and revived 
suspicions about US interests in the Middle East. On the other hand, in the United States, 
Turkish loyalty to the alliance started to seem less assured, even though they continued to 
use Incirlik Airbase to transfer major portions of equipment and personnel to Iraq.132 
 In July 2006, to strengthen the alliance between the United States and Turkey, the 
State Department and Turkish Foreign Ministry negotiated a “Shared Vision and 
Structured Dialogue” which guaranteed cooperation on regional and global challenges 
supported by regular bilateral meetings to keep the cooperation alive. Although both 
countries have been making efforts to protect the alliance, there are still other actors and 
factors affecting their relationship, such as the role of the Armenian and Greek lobbies. 
The Turkish government and the public have been extremely anxious since the US House 
of Representatives considered a resolution on Armenian claims and called the incident in 
1915 a genocide.133 
 One of the most difficult issues between the United States and Turkey centers on 
their cooperation in eliminating Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) terrorist operations from 
northern Iraq which has become a haven for PKK terrorists. The Turkish side has been 
expecting the United States to ensure that its Kurdish allies in Iraq are not supporting 
                                                
131 Frances G. Burwell (2008) “Rebuilding US-Turkey Relations in a Transatlantic Context” in 
Frances G. Burwell (ed.) The Evolution of US-Turkish Relations in a Transatlantic Context: 
Colloquium Report, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army, pp.4-5 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid. 
 52 
terrorist attacks on Turkey. The United States, especially after September 11, has made 
clear that it accepts the importance of stopping terrorism, and the PKK has been 
designated as one of the global terrorist groups. For this reason, the United States 
appointed a special envoy to Turkey, General Joseph Ralston, to deal with the issues of 
PKK and northern Iraq. Until the resignation of Ralston in 2007, little progress was 
made. In 2007, after a terrorist attack which killed forty Turkish people, the Turkish 
parliament authorized military action into northern Iraq which aimed at destroying PKK 
bases. The United States tried to convince Turkey not to take such action, and called on 
the regional government in northern Iraq to deal with the PKK. Turkey waited for a 
while, but because there were no clear results, started a limited military action in the 
border area, mainly air attacks.134 
To understand the changing structure of relations between Turkey and the United 
States, we need to look at the changing domestic structure especially in Turkey. After 
having lived through four military coups and many weak coalition governments in sixty 
years of multiparty democracy, Turkey has been governed by the Justice and 
Development Party (JDP) for the last nine years. The JDP, having its roots in the Turkish 
Islamist movement, had a decisive victory in national elections in 2002, winning by 34 
percent, and raised its vote to 47 percent in the 2007 elections. In the first years, the focus 
of the JDP was on the economic recovery after the 2001 crisis and the accession 
negotiations with the EU. Thus, the JDP was successful in widening its political support, 
including among liberal elements of the society. Although the JDP had a liberal image, it 
always has had problems with the strictly secular system and its defenders, especially the 
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Turkish General Staff.135 
 The JDP and its Islamic past caused a major change in Turkish foreign policy. 
Although at the beginning the JDP had a pro-European image, later on it started to give 
more emphasis to relations with the Middle East, Turkic and Arabic states and Russia. 
From the US perspective, a failure to keep Turkey attached within Europe and the 
transatlantic community could open the door to the possibility of closer Turkish-Russian 
or Turkish– Middle Eastern ties. Especially at a time when the United States has been 
trying to build stability in the Middle East, losing Turkey as a secular and moderate ally 
in the region could be harmful to US interests. The idea of Turkey as a NATO member 
state excluded from the West could be very problematic for both the United States and the 
EU.136 
 Turkey's relations with Israel also have been changing since the JDP came to 
power and began to underscore the Muslim identity of Turkey. Turkey, as the first 
Muslim state to officially recognize Israel in 1949, has had a strategic partnership with 
Israel on the basis of a multilayered set of military, political, and economic interests. 
Although cooperation between the two states continues, there have been some problems. 
Turkey's strong reaction to Israel's invasion of Gaza in 2008, when it accused Israel of 
“inhumane actions” and claimed that “Allah will sooner or later punish those who 
transgress the rights of innocents,” affected bilateral relations and damaged the opinion of 
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both peoples about each other. 137  The Israeli government, the American Jewish 
community, and other supporters of Israel in the United States have been alarmed by 
Turkey's recent rhetoric regarding Gaza and the Turkish government’s steady criticism of 
Israeli policy in general during the past few years.138 With Turkey’s internal political 
transformation and its rapprochement with Iran and Syria, Israelis are relieved that their 
ties with Turkey have not deteriorated any further. Actually, although the relationship 
may have lost the warmth of the 1990s, the leaders of two states continue to meet at the 
highest level. Turkey still recognizes Israel as an important regional power, and knows 
that maintaining strong relations with Israel is important for regional stability and the 
pursuit of Turkey’s broader foreign policy interests especially with the United States.139 
 Although mutual suspicion became a pervasive feature of US-Turkish relations 
after the Iraq War and it has became fashionable for Americans to ask “Who lost 
Turkey?” 140 the United States and Turkey still have strong ties based on their interests. 
The re-emerging of a strategic relationship on the pattern of the Cold War years is 
unlikely to happen, and is not realistic in the changing environment of international 
relations. Turkey and the United States will have a more balanced relationship than the 
patron-client relationship of the Cold War years. This new and important era of 
cooperation has started with President Obama's first official trip as a president to Turkey 
during which he announced, “We share a commitment to democracy, a secular 
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constitution, respect for religious freedom and belief and in free market and a sense of 
global responsibility."141  
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 Chapter 5: The Armenian Question 
 The Armenian Question is an issue between the Armenian people and the Turkish 
Republic centered on different interpretation of a phenomenon that occurred in 1915 
when Turkey was part of the Ottoman Empire. First, I will look at the question itself, then 
I will analyze the public reactions it has created in both Turkey and the United States.  
This is a very important illustration of how lobby groups can draw attention to a problem, 
create favorable public opinion, and then affect domestic and foreign policy-making.  
  
History of the Armenian Question  
 Armenians claim that in 1915, they were killed, tortured and deported from the 
Ottoman Empire. They see these actions as deliberate attempts made by the Ottoman 
government to destroy the ethnoreligious community of Armenians that had existed as a 
part of society.142 
 On the other hand, the Turkish side claims that in 1915, the Empire was involved 
in World War I. During the war, different nations under the weakening Empire were 
trying to gain their independence through rebellions; the Armenian population was one of 
them. Although the Empire took some measures to protect its unity, Turks claim that there 
was no policy aimed at destroying the Armenian nation.  
 This question, actually, dates back before 1915. Traditionally in the Ottoman 
society, Armenians, like other Christian communities, were defined as a dhimmi millet, a 
non-Muslim community of the Empire governed in accordance with sharia law.  The 
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treatment meted out to them by the state varied with the military fortunes of the Empire, 
the religious passions of state elites, or the politics of the international or regional 
relations. Although these communities were free to practice their religion and to follow 
their national traditions, they were considered to be distinctively inferior to Muslims.143  
 In the nineteenth century the Armenians challenged this traditional hierarchy of 
the society, as they became better educated, wealthier, and more urban. The Armenians 
were considered constituent millet of the Ottoman Empire and had good relations with 
the other communities.144  
 In the late 1800s, the Russian Empire began to be highly interested in Armenians 
who had been living in the provinces bordering it such as Van, Bitlis, Kharpert, Sebastia, 
Erzerum, and Diarbekir.145 Russia was claiming to be the protector of the Armenian 
community by positioning itself as the religious leader. Until this time, there was little 
political interest shown by the United States in the area in a period which was relatively 
isolationist in the nineteenth century. Later on, particularly after1890, the US concerns 
started to rise as Russians moved to the Turkish straights.146 
 The Ottoman Empire was very unhappy about the interventions of the Western 
states and Russia into its domestic politics, especially about the minority issues. 
However, it did not have the power to resist their pressures and was engaged in some 
policy reforms including a reorganization which aimed to reduce the hierarchy in the 
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country and to bring Christians to equal status with Muslims.147 But, these reforms did 
not satisfy the foreign states. German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck noted in 1883: “The 
so-called Armenian reforms are ideal and theoretical aspirations, which were given an 
appropriate place in the ornament part of the transactions of the Berlin Congress. Thus, 
they could be used for parliamentary purposes. Their practical significance, whatever the 
final outcome, is very doubtful.”148 According to Simon Payaslian, the final outcome was 
the intensification of Turkish hostilities toward the Armenians, who in turn responded by 
arming themselves rather than continuing to rely on the European powers for 
protection.149  
 Until the beginning of the 20th century, the United States was not involved in the 
Armenian Question seeing it as a domestic problem, and not wanting to damage its 
economic relations with the Turks for any humanitarian reason.150 This was an age in 
which states were the most important actors in international society and all issues 
regarding the population were counted as domestic matters. In 1915, Robert Lensing, the 
Legal Advisor to the State Department in World War I, noted that: “no nation at war, 
whose national safety is menaced, will permit or should be expected to permit obligations 
of justice, morality, humanity or honor to interfere with acts which it considers necessary 
for its self-preservation.”151 
 In 1914, World War I was started. The Ottoman Empire was on the Central 
Powers' side with Germany. In 1915, Armenian Volunteers joined the Russian Army and 
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started to fight against the Ottoman Empire.152  Around 200.000 Armenians joined the 
Allied Powers because of the promise of independence made by the Allied powers.153 In 
April 1915, Enver Pasha, a Turkish military officer and the minister of war at that time, 
warned the Armenian patriarch that if Armenians engaged in revolutionary activities or 
aided the Russian war aims, the government would not be able to prevent the hostilities 
of others towards them. He added that the government could not tolerate internal troubles 
while struggling to defend the country and that the government would employ all means 
necessary to control this situation.154 
 What happened after this date, April 1915, is debatable. The Armenian society 
claims that first, the Armenians serving in the Ottoman Army were turned into labor 
battalions or killed. Then, civilians were deported from Eastern Anatolia and Cilicia to 
the deserts near Aleppo. Armenians claimed that the lines of Armenian deportees were set 
upon by Turkish and Kurdish villagers who were incited and led by specifically 
designated killing squads.155 Thus, Armenians think that in World War I, the Ottoman 
Empire, while fighting on the various fronts, deliberately and systematically tried to 
destroy the Armenian population.  
 On the other hand, the Turkish side claims there were various revolts by people 
from many the nations, leading to many being killed or tortured not just Armenians but 
Turkish, Kurdish, and Arabic people also. So they deny that there was a deliberate and 
systematic effort to destroy the Armenian population.  
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 Today, what is called 'the Armenian Question' refers to the problem of what to call 
the incident because of the ambiguity of the historical data. On the one hand, Armenians 
and their supporters want to call it a “genocide.” On the other hand, the Turkish side 
completely opposes the Armenian claims and do not accept the term genocide. In this 
problem, the most important issue is the use of the term 'Genocide' which is a crime 
under International Law with serious consequences. Turkish advocates oppose the use of 
the term, noting that this term was defined and became a crime under International Law 
after the United Nations Convention on the Crime and Prevention of Genocide was 
passed by the General Assembly on 10 December 1948.156  
 In the next section, I analyze the reactions this question created in both Turkey 
and the United States.  
 
 Public Opinion in the United States 
 As noted in Chapter 2, American public opinion is generally led by the elite and 
media, and lobby groups are particularly important in mobilizing public opinion. In the 
United States, the fragmented structure of the political system, by enabling multiple 
points of access into decision-making, creates opportunity for lobby groups to transfer 
their policy preferences to the policy-makers. These lobby groups try to present their 
interests as an integral part of the US national interest. 157 The Armenian lobby is one of 
the most effective lobby groups in the United States in that it has a substantial impact on 
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Turkish-American relations.  
 The size of the Armenian-American community is estimated at 485,000 according 
to the American Community Survey 2009 data.158 Many Armenian-Americans are well 
educated and in professional occupations such as engineering, medicine, and teaching, 
but only a small number of them have entered the US political scene. However, they have 
the political support of a number of influential congressmen and senators sympathetic to 
the Armenian cause.159 
 The Armenian lobby has been motivated by a collective outburst of anger against 
Turkey. The lobby's first accomplishment was the rejection of the Turkish-American 
Treaty of Lausanne in 1927 by the US Senate. The Armenian Assembly of America 
(AAA) was established in 1972. The AAA, with the financial support it has had, has 
become a very important group within the Armenian lobby. The Armenian National 
Committee of America (ANCA) is another important unit of the Armenian lobby. The 
lobbying agenda of these two organizations focuses on similar issues: (1) seeking the 
recognition of the Armenian 'genocide'; (2) increasing US assistance to Armenia; (3) 
reducing economic and military aid to Turkey; and (4) supporting the self-determination 
of Nagorno-Karabakh. Both the ANCA and the AAA have published books, journals and 
reviews, and organized major conferences and workshops to influence US public opinion 
and to gain political and economic support.160 
 Although the Armenian lobby was effective in the rejection of the Treaty of 
Lausanne in 1927, throughout the Cold War, the anti-Turkish propaganda was ineffective. 
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Moreover, the Armenian terrorist organization, the Armenian Secret Army for the 
Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), by killing 34 Turkish diplomats and their family 
members and wounding 424 others, harmed Armenian efforts to gain public support. The 
end of the Cold War, however, led the Armenian lobby to increase their activities and 
influence on Turkish-American relations.161  
 In 2000, during the final weeks of the legislative session, to benefit from election 
politics, the Armenian lobby, hoping to benefit from electoral politics, supported House 
Resolution (H.R.) 596. This resolution was entitled 'Affirmation of the US Record on the 
Armenian Genocide Resolution,' and although it was legally non-binding, it had a great 
impact on the Turkish public. According to Suhnaz Yilmaz, one of the reasons why this 
resolution was pushed by the Republican House leadership was to increase support for 
their candidate James Rogan who was in a close race with the Democratic candidate in 
California's 27th district, which has a large Armenian-American population.162 The fear of 
losing public support is an important pressure mechanism, and as reflected in this case, it 
has a direct impact on foreign policy.  
 In opposition to the Armenian lobby, the Turkish lobby is another effective group 
in Turkish-American relations. The Turkish lobby is a relative latecomer to Washington 
because until the 1974 Cyprus intervention and the arms embargo following the efforts of 
the Greek lobby, the Turks underestimated the importance of lobbying. The main goal of 
the lobby is to enhance Turkish-American relations, to counteract anti-Turkish 
propaganda in the United States, and to educate the American public about Turkey and 
such concerns of the Turkish-Americans as the rejection of the Armenian claims about 
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“genocide.” But there are some disadvantages experienced by the Turkish Lobby. The 
Turkish community, for instance, is smaller in size than the Armenians, it is around 
350,000 people, and these people are generally first or second generation Turks living in 
the United States. The Turks are relatively less integrated, although they try to maintain 
their Turkish identity which is dissimilar to the American identity. In particular, religion 
is a very private issue for the Muslim Turkish community, unlike the Armenians, who, 
through Christianity, share an important characteristic with most of American society. 
The economic power of the Turkish community is also weaker than that of other 
lobbies.163 
 The Assembly of Turkish-American Associations (ATAA) and the Federation of 
the Turkish-American Associations (FTAA) are umbrella organizations for over 100 
Turkish associations in the United States. Both organizations undertake a number of 
activities, including educational seminars to the Turkish-American community to 
encourage them to engage in political activism and leadership. They organize conferences 
to inform the American public about the issues concerning the Turkish-American 
community. An important project, undertaken by the ATAA, has been organized 
educational seminars about Turkey and the Turks for American high-school teachers. The 
Turkish Day Parade, organized by the FTAA, is a very important public relations activity, 
which usually attracts over 45,000 participants. These organizations also publish books, 
newspapers, and journals to inform the general public. Still, the Turkish Lobby is not 
powerful enough to work effectively against the anti-Turkish propaganda of the other 
ethnic lobbies, such as the Armenians.164 
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 In 2010, House Resolution (H.R) 252, 165  the recognition of the Armenian 
“genocide,”  passed the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC), by a vote of 23-22, 
despite the efforts of the Turkish Lobby. There were thousands of letters, phone calls, e-
mails and faxes sent to the Committee members by the Turkish-American community.166 
When the resolution came to the Congress, both the Armenian and Turkish lobbies 
actively worked to influence the public to pressure the congressmen to change their votes. 
The resolution was eventually rejected by the Congress. This result was welcomed and 
celebrated by the Turkish Lobby and accepted as a success of their lobbying.167  
 There are also other ethnic lobby groups supporting either the Turkish or the 
Armenian lobbies. The Greek lobby, for instance, supports the Armenian claims about the 
recognition of the Armenian 'genocide'. The American Hellenic Institution (AHI) 
congratulated the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee for the 
passage of the Armenian Genocide Resolution, H.R. 252, and urged the Greek American 
community to contact their US representatives to urge co-sponsorship and support for 
H.R. 252.168 On the other hand, the Jewish Lobby has been a supporter of the Turkish 
Lobby since the end of the Cold War when the Turkish-Israeli partnership established. In 
the Armenian case, although the Jewish lobby publicly does not reject the Armenian 
claims, they support the Turkish lobby so as not to harm the Turkish-Israeli relations.169 
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The sympathy of the other ethnic groups is very important for the lobbies as they seek 
wider public support.  
 As can be seen, in the United States, public opinion on the Armenian Question is 
determined by the influences of lobbies, specifically the Turkish and the Armenian 
lobbies. These lobbies use the power of public opinion, and their biggest pressure tool is 
voting. In the Armenian case aspects of American identity are also come into play. As 
discussed in the second chapter, Americans tend to feel responsible for other nations 
because they see the United States as the world leader. The memories and stories of 
massacres influence the American public and lead them to defend the Armenians. 
Americans are also generally sensitive about Christianity which is a shared characteristic 
between them and the Armenians. These are important factors that strengthen the lobby 
groups and help them gain support more easily. The Turks, however, are pictured as 
barbarian by the Armenians. Thus, it is harder for them to tell their perspectives because 
of the bias towards them. They are also, because of their Muslim identity, at a 
disadvantage because they do not share an important aspect of the American identity as 
the Armenians do. 
 Although the American identity is important in determining American public 
opinion, issues such as the Armenian Question only some to public attention through the 
mobilization of the lobbies. Mobilized public opinion then affects foreign policy making 
through the pressure exerted on politicians. 
 
 Public Opinion in Turkey 
 Turkish public opinion is a natural extension of Turkish national identity. Thus, 
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national and religious problems can generate strong public reaction in Turkey. The 
Armenian Question is a good example of how certain issues affect the sensitivities of the 
Turkish nation. The nation feels that it is blamed for killing the Armenians and the Turks 
are offended by the Armenian claims. These feelings lead them to behave defensively and 
aggressively. The issue is called the 'so-called genocide' by the Turkish public and the 
Turkish media.  
 The elites and the masses seem to be in harmony on this issue. Except for some 
left wing groups, the majority of the public is against the recognition of the phenomenon 
as genocide. However, leftist campaign began in 2010 with the name “I apologize”. In 
this campaign, various writers, artists and businessmen signed a text saying that: “My 
conscience does not accept the insensitivity shown to and the denial of the Great 
Catastrophe that the Ottoman Armenians were subjected to in 1915. I reject this injustice 
and for my share, I empathize with the feelings and pain of my Armenian brothers and 
sisters. I apologize to them.”170 By signing this text, the elites showed that although they 
do not accept the incident as “genocide,” they accept the fact that the Armenians are 
owed an apology. But just after this campaign started, another campaign under the name 
“I don't apologize” began and was signed by more than 80,000 Turkish citizens.171 
 On 5 March 2010, when the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs 
Committee passed the Armenian Genocide Resolution, H.R. 252, the Turkish public 
reacted very nationalistically. In all leading newspapers, such as Hurriyet, Zaman or 
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Milliyet, the general tone was defensive and disappointed.172 Although the non-binding 
character of the resolution calmed reactions, the public was disappointed by the decision. 
A new online campaign was created by some writers to protest the decision. Called 
“Ermeni Yalanlari: Yeter Artik!” (“Armenian Lies: That's Enough!”), it gathered more 
than one million people supporting.173 There were many local protests held in different 
cities in Turkey especially by university students. As noted in chapter 2, the relationship 
between the masses, the elites and the policy-makers in Turkey is relatively direct and 
homogenous. The policy-makers are aware of the public’s feelings and the elites do not 
need to mediate. This case was a typical example of that relationship. The foreign 
minister Ahmet Davutoglu organized a press meeting right after the decision was made 
and noted that this decision harmed the feelings of the Turkish people.174 Furthermore 
Ambassador Namik Tan was recalled from the United States to Turkey to show the 
displeasure of the government people. 
 To sum up, Turkish public opinion on the Armenian Question is fed by 
nationalism. The Turkish policy-makers also share this attitude and therefore they can act 
in tune with the public opinion without necessarily depending on the elites.  
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 Chapter 6: The Cyprus Problem  
 The Cyprus problem is a territorial dispute between Turkish and Greek Cypriots 
and involving also Turkey and Greece as stakeholders. The United States, the European 
Union and the United Nations have been involved in attempts to resolve the conflict. I 
will summarize the long history of the conflict in the island, then look at public reaction 
to the problem in both Turkey and the United States.  
 The History of the Cyprus Problem 
 Cyprus, an island located in the Eastern Mediterranean, has been an area of 
conflict from the very beginning of its history. This third largest island of the 
Mediterranean has changed hands continuously because of its geostrategic location and 
rich copper mines. Cyprus was ruled by various nations including Egyptians, Persians, 
Romans, Byzantines, Franks, Venetians, Turks and the British.175 
 The ancestors of the Greek Cypriots are Aegean colonists who came from Greece 
and Anatolia between 1400 and 800 B.C. Later on, in the Byzantine period, Greek 
influence on the island was consolidated. Although Franks, Venetians, and Romans 
respectively tried to eliminate the people's allegiance to the Greek Orthodox Church, they 
only forced it to go underground. 176 
 The Ottoman Empire conquered the island in 1571 after 400 years of Latin rule. 
The Turks first abolished feudalism, then restored the Greek Orthodox Church to its 
former dominant position. Finally, they brought in a number of Turkish settlers and 
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gradually a Turkish Cypriot community was formed on the island.177 The Ottomans 
applied the same policy to every territory they conquered; they respected the religion and 
traditions of the natives, and they brought Turkish settlers in to form a Turkish 
community.  
 The abolition of feudalism made the Church the central institution in the Greek 
Cypriot community. Sultan Selim II also gave some secular authority to the Church 
including the regest to collect the state tax. Throughout the Ottoman period, the Greek 
Ottoman Church was the central institution around which the political, intellectual, and 
cultural life of the Greek Cypriots revolved.178 Thus, it is not surprising that the Church 
was the leader in the fight for enosis, the ideal of the Greek-Cypriots to unify Cyprus 
with Greece. 
 The Ottoman control of Cyprus ended in 1878 when Britain took control of the 
island in exchange for British support against Russia. Actually, British rule in Cyprus was 
only supposed to last until the Ottomans recaptured the eastern territories they lost to 
Russia. The new British   administration was welcomed by the Greek Cypriot community 
because they saw this change as a step forward to enosis. These expectations frightened 
the Turkish Cypriots because they thought that they would be unable to protect their 
rights in a Cyprus united with Greece. The Turkish Cypriots expected that if the British 
decided to give up Cyprus, it would be returned to the Ottoman Empire.  But, after the 
World War I, Britain continued to rule the island, and the British rule was recognized by 
Greece and Turkey with the 1923 Lausanne Treaty. The new Turkish Republic under the 
leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk had already renounced, in 1920, all Turkish claims 
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over areas inhabited by non-Turkish majorities. This attitude adopted in Lausanne 
continued as a foreign policy strategy until the 1950s. In compliance with this strategy, 
the Turkish government supported emigration of Turkish Cypriots to Turkey. But the 
British administration did not want to deal with a pro-enosis Greek population without an 
opposing Turkish community and so the British “created a variety of bureaucratic 
difficulties in order to retain a sizeable Turkish community in Cyprus.”179  
 In order not to lose British support, both Turkey and Greece remained neutral on 
the Cyprus issue until the end of World War II. Although there was increasing pro-enosis 
support in both Greece and Cyprus, the Greek government did not raise the Cyprus 
question at the United Nations until 1954. Turkey, on the other hand, continued to support 
the British sovereignty over Cyprus until the end of the 1950s. The Turkish government 
believed that Britain could protect the island from the rising Soviet expansionism and the 
enosis plans.180  
 In 1954, Greece raised the Cyprus problem at the UN and called for international 
support for Cypriot self-determination. The Greeks thought that self-determination could 
be the first step in the enosis process. The General Assembly, with the strong support of 
Turkish and American representatives, rejected the draft resolution by declaring that the 
“adoption of any resolution would harm good relations between some of our friends and 
allies.”181 This rejection caused Greek Cypriots to feel isolated, and this feeling led to the 
establishment of the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) a guerilla 
organization. In turn, a Turkish paramilitary organization, Turkish Resistance 
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Organization (TMT), was established to protect Turkish Cypriots from EOKA attacks. 
Faced with an increasing tension on the island, the Turkish government, led by Prime 
Minister Adnan Menderes, revised the Turkish policy toward Cyprus, and decided to 
claim possession of the island if Britain were to give up Cyprus. According to Suha 
Bolukbasi, this demand for the return of Cyprus to Turkey was a reaction to Greece's 
enosis efforts; the Turkish government did not seriously believe that Turkey would ever 
be sovereign over the whole of Cyprus. Thus, the Turks did not present any draft 
resolutions to the UN.182  
 In 1957, Turkey changed its strategy again, and started to suggest the partition of 
Cyprus into two states. In 1958, Britain announced that the government would implement 
a plan granting self-government to the island because the sovereignty over the island had 
become very costly due to the ongoing EOKA and TMT warfare. According to this plan, 
even though Britain would have to give up its sovereignty, it would be able to keep its 
military bases on the island.183 In 1959, Turkish, Turkish Cypriot, Greek and Greek 
Cypriot representatives came together in London, and drafted a constitution for a new 
republic. In August 1960, the Cyprus Republic was proclaimed.184  
 The United States watched this whole period closely and was pleased with the 
agreements which seemed to eliminate serious frictions in the relations between three of 
its allies. The Cyprus problem was important for the United States because it did not want 
two of its NATO allies to be foes. Thus, when the conflict arose in the island again, the 
United States reacted very aggressively.  
 The newly established republic was far from providing stability to the Cypriots. In 
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December 1963, the intercommunal violence started again on the island when Greek 
Cypriot policemen murdered two Turkish civilians at a checkpoint near Nicosia. Within 
hours, Greek Cypriot policemen and some EOKA members started an all-out attack on 
Turkish quarters throughout Cyprus. Later on the tension quickly rose between the two 
communities. The United States carefully watched the island and urged Turkey and 
Greece to be calm and not to employ warfare. Turkey, Greece and Britain decided to 
establish a joint peacekeeping force to stop the ongoing violence in Cyprus. None of 
these efforts including the 1964 London Conference to create a new constitution, did 
anything to end the violence. On March 14, 1964, a UN peacekeeping force arrived in 
Cyprus to stop the warfare but it was not successful. In May 1964, thirty-five Turkish 
Cypriots were found dead near Nicosia. Turkish Prime Minister Inonu was trying to solve 
the problem without armed conflict because he feared the possibility of losing Western 
support in the Cold War. But, in the end, Inonu accepted the need for a military operation. 
On June 4, 1964, Inonu shared the intervention plans with US Ambassador Raymond 
Hare. The ambassador asked for a twenty-four hour delay to consult the US 
administration, and Inonu accepted. The message that came from the United States, the 
infamous Johnson Letter, was unexpectedly harsh and threatening. In this letter, Johnson 
clearly opposed any military actions, which could harm the stability between NATO 
allies. He added that in a possible Turkish military intervention, NATO would reconsider 
whether the members have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union. 
Inonu cancelled the operation and accepted Johnson's offer of discussions in 
Washington.185 This step back and the reaction it created will be discussed in the next 
section.  
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 In August 1964, the Greek armed forces started another total operation against the 
Turkish community. The Turkish government decided to employ limited aerial bombings 
to stop the attacks, and the operation was started on August 8, 1964. These bombings did 
not stop the Greek forces, but just increased the tension on the island. Until another crisis 
occurred in Cyprus, which was followed by a military operation by Turkey, all peace 
efforts had already proved to be useless.186 
 On July 20, 1974, Turkey's 'Peace Operation' into Cyprus started. Bulent Ecevit, 
the Turkish prime minister, ordered that the use of force and bombings be limited and that 
the troops not shoot unless shot at. This two-day limited military operation was accepted 
as legitimate by the international public because there had been a military coup in Cyprus 
supported by the Greek junta that put a president, Nikos Sampson, into power. Sampson 
was known as “a sadistic killer of Turks and Britons.”187  
 The United States, under Secretary of State Kissinger, started efforts to contain a 
larger conflict between Turkey and Greece. Along with the bilateral talks, Kissinger 
pushed the UN Security Council to call both Turkey and Greece to the conference table to 
announce their adoption of a truce. On July 25, 1974 the first Geneva Conference opened. 
However, the conference did not solve the problem, so on August 9, 1974, the Second 
Geneva Conference was held. The Turkish side defended territorial federation model but 
the Greeks did not accept this solution. By the end of August 13, 1974, the Turkish 
representatives became convinced that the continuation of the negotiations would bring 
no favorable results. Thus, on August 14, 1974 the second phase of Turkey's Cyprus 
'Peace Operation' was started but it was much more aggressive than the first one. This 
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second operation was met with displeasure from the international community, and the 
United States imposed an arms embargo on Turkey as a result.188  
       The second military operation divided the island and set the borders that are in 
place today (See Map 6.1). Between 1980 and 1983, intercommunal talks continued in 
Nicosia. But these talks also could not solve the problem and no agreement could be 
reached. On November 15, 1983, the Turkish Cypriots unilaterally declared its 
independence and established the Turkish Republic of the Northern Cyprus (TRNC), 
which so far had not been 
recognized by any country 
except Turkey.189 
 There have been 
various attempts to resolve the 
Cyprus Problem throughout 
the years. In 2004, after years 
of negotiations, a UN 
proposal, known as the Annan Plan, was offered by the UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan. This proposal aimed at the unity of the two communities within a United Cyprus 
Republic. But this proposal was not passed in a referendum held in April 2004. In May of 
the same year, the Greek administration of Southern Cyprus joined the European Union.  
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 Public Opinion in the United States 
 The Cyprus issue was a very important issue for the United States during the Cold 
War. The stability of the Mediterranean region and the maintenance of good relations 
between friendship of its NATO allies with each other were important aspects of 
American policy. Thus, the United States became involved in the issue from the moment 
Britain decided to give up the rule of Cyprus. Along with the national interest, there is 
another important element that led the United States to become involved in the issue, that 
is the influence of the lobby groups in the United States. The roles of the Greek and 
Turkish lobbies in US foreign-policy making should be analyzed as important factors 
affecting the decisions made.  
 The Greek Orthodox Church in the United States has been very active in 
communicating a deep concern over Cyprus to its members and mobilizing Greek 
American citizens to force American officials and legislators toward favorable actions.190 
When Turkey started its second military operation in August 1974, the Greek Orthodox 
Church played a significant role in activating three million Greek American citizens. The 
Church wanted the United States to cut all military and economic aid to Turkey. 191 The 
role of the Church with regards to the arms embargo was so great that in October 1974, 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger met with Archbishop Iakovos in order to persuade 
him to calm his community.192 The activities of the Church were way aggressive. 
Throughout the congressional deliberations on the Turkish arms embargo, “Greek 
Orthodox priests read from the pulpit the names of the damned-congressmen who voted 
                                                
190 Nasuh Uslu (2003) The Turkish-American Relationship Between 1947 and 2003: The History 
of a Distinctive Alliance, New York: Nova Science Publishers, p. 214 
191 Suha Bolukbasi (1988) pp. 214 
192 Nasuh Uslu (2003) p. 214 
 76 
with the Administration against the Turkish ban,” and urged the Greek American 
community to pressure their representatives to change their votes. During the church 
services petitions urging the Congressmen to support the embargo on Turkey were 
circulated among the people.193 
 There were also other Greek-American groups lobbying against Turkey. On July 
39, 1974, the Greek associations and religious organizations came together in a meeting 
and decided to establish a 'Public Relations Office' to ask Congress to cut all military and 
economic aid to Turkey. As a result of this decision, the Orthodox Church organized a 
'letter-writing and telegram/telephone campaigns' by using its front organization, the 
United Hellenic American Congress (UHAC). The American Hellenic Educational 
Progressive Association (AHEPA) was another important lobby in that period. AHEPA is 
an organization which has offices in every state and around 125,000 active members. In 
1974, AHEPA urged Greek Americans to write personal letters to those Congressmen and 
Senators who seemed to favor Turkey. AHEPA along with the American Hellenic Institute 
(AHI), another Greek lobby group, maintained voting records on individual Congressmen 
and Senators, and they mounted massive telephone campaigns across the country to 
pressure those who were undecided.194 
 Daily demonstrations were also staged by Greek-Americans everyday for a period 
in Washington D.C. and New York. Some of these demonstrations attracted 70,000 
people who were not only Greek Americans but Armenians and other Americans. 
Watching these activities, Senator Eagleton said that “The United States Senate and other 
branches of the Federal Government have become aware of a new political force in this 
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country.”195  
 Congressmen were influenced by the efforts of Greek Americans in their voting 
on the embargo issue because they wanted to secure the support of Greek Americans in 
the approaching congressional elections. The Greek Americans constituted a politically 
and socially activated segment of the US population. When the arms embargo was 
imposed, it was welcomed as a victory by the Greek lobby.196 The arms embargo was the 
most crucial US policy decision after the Johnson Letter imposed to force Turkey to act 
in a certain way, and this act caused a negative reaction from the Turkish people toward 
the United States.  
 The Turkish lobby was a latecomer to Washington. Until the arms embargo was 
imposed, the Turkish-American community underestimated the importance of lobbying 
activities. The Turkish lobby, led by FTAA and ATAA, has organized seminars and 
conferences to inform American public about the Turkish position in Cyprus.197 The 
lobby defends the rightness and legitimacy of the 1974 Turkish military operations and 
supports the Turkish military presence in Northern Cyprus today. The main goal of the 
Turkish Lobby is to gain US support and recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus (TRNC). The lobby uses cultural festivals as platforms for sharing their 
perspective on Cyprus with the American public. On the anniversaries of the 1974 
Turkish military operation, the Turkish-American community celebrates the emancipation 
of the Turkish Cypriots from the Greek Cypriot “terrorism.”198 Although the Turkish 
community is smaller in size, with the support of the Turkish government, it is actively 
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working in the United States to promote Turkey's importance for the United States to the 
US public. 
 The general media does not have a special interest in the issue unless there is a 
change in the situation or a specific campaign by the two communities. Thus, in this 
issue, it is not wrong to say that the main determiners of public opinion are the ethnic 
lobbies. The lobbies try to inform the American public about their positions, and to 
convince Americans on the correctness of their own positions. By doing that, the lobbiess 
wish to gain support of the general public to pressure the policy-makers.  
  
 Public Opinion in Turkey 
 The Turkish public is highly sensitive about issues concerning their nationality. 
The Cyprus problem is one of the sensitive issues for the Turkish public. The first large 
reaction of the Turkish public came after the publication of the Johnson Letter in 1964. 
The threatening tone of the telegram caused disappointment and anger in Turkey toward 
the United States. The Turks thought that this letter put Turkey in a position of puppet 
state, and they found unacceptable the use of the US-Turkish alliance as a threat to 
prevent their action in a matter of vital national interest.199 Several demonstrations took 
place to condemn the United States. The speakers at these demonstrations denounced the 
United States and President Johnson as false friends of Turkey and accused them of 
betraying Turkey over Cyprus. 200 The Johnson Letter, today, is considered as a diplomatic 
mistake by Turkish scholars, such as Nasuh Uslu, because it caused widespread anti-
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Americanism in Turkey.201 
 The Turkish public in general has supported the Turkish military presence in 
Cyprus since the 1974 Turkish military operation. From the beginning, the Turkish 
military operation received unanimous support from Turkish public opinion. According to 
Nasuh Uslu, there was no other issue, domestic or foreign, on which there was such 
unanimity in Turkey. All major parties and the domestic public have supported the 
Turkish military action and continuation of the military presence. When the arms 
embargo was employed, Turkish public opinion unanimously condemned it as an anti-
Turkish move and deplored the use of arms supplies as a tool to exert power over Turkish 
policy.202 
 The Turkish media reflects Turkish public opinion in the Cyprus problem. Every 
new development in the case is met by nationalistic reactions of the leading Turkish 
media. On April 25, 2004, for instance, one day after the Annan Plan referendum held in 
Cyprus, the Hurriyet, a leading newspaper in Turkey, carried a heading, “Greeks said 'no' 
to peace.”203 Another newspaper Milliyet also carried the referendum results in its 
heading and said that “Now all the world needs to see, Turks want peace but Greeks 
not.”204 
 To sum up, Turkish public opinion sees Cyprus as a part of Turkey and Turkish 
Cypriots as a part of the Turkish community. Thus Turks react strongly to any 
intervention in the Turkish policy toward Cyprus. There is no major distinction visible 
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between the mass and the elites about the Cyprus problem.  
It is not that there are no groups that oppose the Turkish intervention and the 
ongoing presence. The first group, including liberal writers and opinion leaders such as 
Ahmet Altan and Ertugrul Ozkok, believe that Turkish Cypriots should be free to decide 
on what they want, and that the Turkish military should be withdrawn from the island as 
soon as possible to facilitation a peaceful solution.205 The second group is composed of 
socialists and communists who define Turkish policies on Cyprus as “imperialistic” and 
want Turkey to remove all political and military influence from the island. For instance, 
in his book The Cyprus Issue, the head of the Turkish Labor Party Dogu Perincek claims 
that Turkey is an invader in Cyprus and should withdraw all its forces.206 A third group is 
composed of a less organized group of people with various ideologies who state that 
Turkey would be better off if the economic and political “burden” of Cyprus is 
relieved.207 However, relative to the underground nationalistic support for Turkey on this 
issue, the opposition’s voices are relatively muted.  
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Chapter 7: Turkey’s Accession into the European Union 
Turkey has been officially waiting for its accession into the European Union (EU) 
for more than twenty years as a candidate country. But actually this candidacy is just a 
small part of the long-run efforts of Turkey to be recognized as a member of the Western 
world - a status sought by Turkish and Ottoman governments for almost 150 years.208 For 
Turkey, acceptance into the European Union meant Westernization, enlightenment and a 
move towards modernity.209 The United States, as the strategic partner of Turkey, 
supports its accession into the EU, even though there are various domestic groups 
opposing US support in the United States, such as the Armenian and Greek lobbies.  
 
Turkey-EU Relations 
Turkey’s relations with the European Union date back to the 1950s when it 
applied for membership of the European Economic Community (EEC). On 12 September 
1963, Turkey and the EEC signed the Association Agreement (Ankara Agreement) to 
grant membership to Turkey, which is accepted as the official starting point of Turkey-EU 
relations. The Ankara Agreement set up a customs union, which would be completed in 
twenty-two years, to foster economic integration, and an Association Council to meet 
regularly to follow up the agreement. Turkey has viewed the agreement as a promise for 
the country’s eventual accession to EEC/EU because Article 28 of the agreement stated, 
“when both parties are ready to assume the obligations arising from membership, then 
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Turkey’s accession will be possible.”210 Therefore, this agreement forms a legitimate 
basis for Turkey’s eligibility for EU membership. 
Starting from the Ankara Agreement, Turkey and the European Union have had a 
problematic relationship changing according to the political environment in both Turkey 
and the European Union. For instance, following the military interventions in Turkey in 
1971 and 1980, the European Union suspended all economic and military assistance to 
Turkish governments. After years of economic and political recovery, Turkey applied 
officially to the European Union in 1987 when the Turkish government felt ready to be a 
part of the EU.211 On 18 December 1989, the EEC rejected the request to start accession 
negotiations with Turkey right away by giving economic and political reasons such as the 
negative effects of the Cyprus Problem between Turkey and Greece, a member state. 
However, the EEC did not end its cooperation with Turkey, stating instead that the 
Community had a fundamental interest in working together with Turkey, and that it 
would help Turkey to complete the process of political and economic modernization.212 
In the 1980s and the 1990s, Turkey rather than “being a ‘natural insider’ was an  
‘important outsider’ with whom …[the European Community sought to develop 
relations] on an arm's length basis barring full integration.” 213  
In 1995, the final stage of the customs union began. This step gave Turkey the 
hopes that economic cooperation could strengthen institutional cooperation and deepen 
political dialogue. On 13 December 1995, the European Parliament gave its assent to the 
Customs Union.  
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In April 1997, the European Union reaffirmed Turkey’s eligibility for EU 
membership as an equal candidate with the other applicant countries. On 15 July 1997, 
the European Union adopted Agenda 2000, which listed the needs of Turkey for 
membership including the resolution of the Cyprus Problem and improvements in the 
human rights situation. On the same day, the Customs Union was extended to new fields 
to step up economic cooperation. But in December 1997, relations entered a difficult 
phase as a result of the rejection of Turkey’s bid for candidacy status while eleven other 
states were granted formal candidacy status. Instead, the European Union decided to draw 
up a strategy to prepare Turkey for candidacy. This strategy included the intensification 
of the economic and financial cooperation, and the adoption by Turkey of the EU’s 
acquis communautaire, the cumulative body of European Union laws.214 This strategy 
was later named the “Copenhagen Criteria.” But Turkey reacted very negatively to the 
rejection of its candidacy maintaining that it had received discriminatory treatment 
compared with the other applicant countries, none of which enjoyed a customs union with 
the European Union, and some of which were weaker democracies and economies such 
as Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.215 The Turkish government stated that it was 
suspending political dialogue with the European Union and it would no longer discuss 
political issues such as the Cyprus Problem, or human rights. Later on how efforts by the 
European Union led to the acceptance by Turkey of a “European Strategy” and the stair 
of preparation for Turkey’s future candidacy.216  
In December 1999, formal Turkish candidacy was granted at the Helsinki summit. 
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Throughout the summit, American diplomats brought intense pressure to bear on the 
British and German delegations to support the Turkish position.217 This decision was a 
turning point in EU-Turkey relations providing Turkey, like other candidate countries, 
with a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms. In 8 March 2001, the 
Accession Partnership for Turkey was formally adopted by the European Council, setting 
out the priority areas for further work in a single framework. According to this 
framework, Turkey revised its “National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis,” which 
set out the policy framework, the schedule for adopting new legislation, policies and 
practices, and the administrative and budgetary requirements, and approved this agenda 
on 19 March 2001.218 
In December 2004, finally the European Union decided that Turkey had fulfilled 
the Copenhagen Criteria, and that the accession negotiations should be opened without 
delay. On 3 October 2005, accession negotiations were opened with Turkey. Today, the 
adaptation to the EU acquis is currently ongoing in Turkey in various areas. On 30 June 
2010, negotiations opened on food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy.219 
 
The Role of the United States in Turkey-EU Relations 
Throughout the ongoing process, the United States actively sponsored Turkey’s 
application to join the European Union. According to William Wallace, the reason for the 
United States support of Turkey’s accession bid was that it saw Turkey as a key member 
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of NATO, and the EU as the external anchor that would keep this Muslim state within the 
West. But the European governments were conscious that Turkey-EU relations were far 
more complex than Washington’s “politico-military policy-makers wished to consider.”220 
The key reason for this difference in the attitude toward Turkey was that Turkey’s joining 
in the European Union did not involve any explicit costs for the United States. On the 
other hand, for Europeans, the potential costs of Turkish accession have been important, 
such as its impact on employment prospects, community-wide budgetary transfers, 
agriculture policy, the decision making process, and so on.221 There is another difference 
between the European Union and the United States which is that the United States is a 
much more security-oriented entity than the European Union. Thus, from an American 
perspective “the security producing credentials of Turkey were of greater importance than 
its immediate democratic deficits, constituting a strong basis for rapid progress towards 
EU accession.”222 On the other hand, the more inward-oriented European Union has had 
the fear that the incorporation of Turkey would link the European Union to a highly 
unstable part of the world, and would import insecurity and instability.223    
For the United States, supporting Turkish accession was a part of its Cold War 
strategy to keep the Western alliance together at the beginning. Turkey was a strategically 
important state, which had to be protected from Soviet expansion. In the post-Cold War 
period, Turkey’s claim to a central status rested on its attractiveness as an emerging 
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market, and especially after 9/11, its capacity and willingness to fight global terrorism.224   
American support for Turkey became visible through three key developments in 
the 1990s. First, the lobbying activities of American diplomats were very effective in the 
negotiations leading to the signing of the Customs Union. Prior to the vote in the 
European Parliament, the Europeans did not seem to favor a formal customs union with 
Turkey.225 However, active lobbies of American officials played an important role in 
turning the decision in favor of the outcome desired by Turkey. Second, American 
officials played an important role in the 1999 Helsinki summit in which the formal 
candidacy status of Turkey was accepted. In this decision, not just the American 
diplomats but also the Clinton administration was influential, employing significant 
pressure through both formal and informal channels, including direct telephone calls by 
President Clinton to European leaders.226 President Clinton, after the decision given, 
released an official statement noting that the United States welcomed the decision with 
pleasure, and repeated American support for Turkey’s bid.227 
The third development differs from the first two because along with American 
support, it clearly displayed the limits of American power in European Union decision-
making.228 The United States once again launched a major lobbying campaign to support 
Turkey prior to the Copenhagen summit in 2002. President Bush, like President Clinton, 
made several telephone calls to European leaders to show American support. But, unlike 
                                                
224 Ziya Onis and Suhnaz Yilmaz (2005) p.271. 
225 Sabri Sayari (2003) The United States and Turkey's Membership in the European Union, The 
Turkish Yearbook of International Relations. The .pdf version of the article is available at 
http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/44/674/8589.pdf accessed on 19 April 2011. 
226 Ibid. 
227 "Clinton Welcomes Turkey's Acceptance of EU Offer," released by the US Mission to the EU, 
11 December 1991 from http://www.useu.be/ISSUES/turkl211 .html  
228 Ziya Onis and Suhnaz Yilmaz (2005) p.273 
 87 
the previous campaigns, this time the efforts did not achieve their goal.229 On the 
contrary, some Europeans complained about the persistent American pressure for 
Turkey's EU membership calling then counterproductive. Moreover, those pressures had 
an important negative side effect, that is the assumption of Turkish politicians that they 
could avoid implementing certain key components with American support.230 
Sabri Sayari notes that it is important to remember that the United States has not 
asked Europeans to change the membership criteria or show special favor to Turkey 
while they support Turkey’s membership. Instead, American officials accept the right of 
the European Union to apply membership rules, and they ask the European Union to offer 
Turkey equal treatment with other applicants and to reject any religious or cultural 
criteria as the basis for gaining membership.231 According to the United States, alienating 
Turkey by adopting a rejectionist attitude is not beneficial for all three actors. Americans 
accept that Turkey needs to undertake many political reforms on the way to full 
membership.  
The support of the United States has changed in the post-Copenhagen period. The 
United States became less likely to pursue highly visible activism to promote Turkish 
membership and to invest as much diplomatic energy and capital as it did in the past. 
There are two major reasons for this policy change: (1) the Turkish parliament’s refusal to 
grant American troops transit rights on 1 March 2003;232 and (2) the idea that the United 
States has already achieved its aims by making Turkey a formal candidate and it does not 
want to risk further problems in the aftermath of the Iraq war which already created 
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problems between the United States and the European states.233  
Although US support has diminished in activism, it is less likely to end in the near 
future because, as Sabri Sayari notes, “Washington's position on this issue is well 
established and it has become one of the important anchors of the bilateral ties between 
Washington and Ankara.”234 An important point to mention is that the increasing distance 
between Turkey and the United States has helped Turkey to move closer to the core 
Franco-German alliance which constitutes the dominant force within the European 
Union. And there are some scholars, such as Ziya Onis and Suhnaz Yilmaz, who think 
that this change in US support is beneficial in terms of pushing Turkey to fulfill the 
membership criteria.235  
 
Public Opinion in the United States 
Turkish membership in the European Union is the only internal EU issue in which 
the United States has been so actively involved and asserted a right.236 In domestic 
politics, however, the issue does not attract public attention unless some lobby groups 
draw attention to it.  There are various groups trying to influence US support. The major 
ones are the Greek, Armenian and Turkish lobbies.  
The Greek and the Armenian lobbies try to diminish US support for Turkey 
joining into the European Union. A Turkish scholar, Burak Akcapar, claims that these 
lobbies demonstrate “zero regard for the strong mutual interests inherent in US-Turkish 
relations,” but they are not very effective because “the dominant policy did not agree in 
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their outlook.”237 Both the Armenian and the Greek lobbies organize conferences, make 
campaigns and publish press releases to diminish US support on the Turkish bid.  
In 2004, during his official visit to Turkey to participate in the NATO summit, 
President Bush called for the European Union to support Turkey's candidacy for 
membership. He described Turkey as a strong, secular democracy, and a close ally of free 
nations, and added that “with 150 years of democratic and social reform, stands as a 
model to others, and as Europe’s bridge to the wider world.”238 In reaction, the Armenian 
National Committee of America (ANCA)’s Chairman Ken Hachikian and American 
Hellenic Institute (AHI) President Gene Rossides wrote a letter to the President. In that 
letter, both the ANCA and AHI representatives expressed their concerns about US support 
for Turkish membership, writing that, “the reality is that Turkey is neither secular nor 
democratic and, if anything, represents a negative role model for the states of the region.” 
Later in this letter, they wrote that Turkey’s membership in the European Union “does not 
enjoy the backing of our nation’s citizens, who recognize that the Turkish government 
falls far short of meeting even the most basic standards of democracy and human rights 
that we embrace as Americans.”239  
The Armenian lobby, along with the Armenian organizations in Europe, opposes 
Turkey’s joining the European Union unless it recognizes the Armenian “Genocide.” But, 
ironically, the Armenian government supports the Turkish bid, because Armenia sees that 
Turkey’s joining might help the two countries to improve their relations.240 The Greek 
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lobby has a more aggressive attitude. The American Hellenic Institute wrote that there is 
no hope for Turkey to evolve into a democratic state so the United States should change 
its strategy and not support Turkey’s membership in the European Union.241 
On the other hand, the Turkish lobby works to increase US support for the Turkish 
bid and to minimize the influence of the Armenian and Greek lobbies. On this issue, the 
Turkish-American business elites are more interested. The American-Turkish Council, a 
business association works for enhancing the promotion of US-Turkish commercial 
relations, organizes annual conferences that address the key issues including US support 
for Turkey’s European bid.242 In 2006, at the 25th Annual Conference of the American 
Turkish Council (ATC), where Turkey's EU bid was at the forefront of the discussions, 
US Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs Matt Bryza described Turkey 
as a “successful country with its majority-Muslim population but democratic and secular 
governmental system.” At that conference Bryza repeated US support for the Turkish 
bid.243 According to Bryza, Turkey’s EU membership “has a key role in countering 
radical Islam.”244 
 
Public Opinion in Turkey 
In Turkish public opinion literature, the issue of Turkish membership in the 
European Union is generally referred to as an “elite project,” because, traditionally, the 
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European integration process is seen as being driven by elites.245 Turkish elites, always 
defend the discourse of “giving” what is good for the people even they do not 
“understand.” What is good is generally described by Western values, and membership in 
the European Union is seen as the final point of Turkish Westernization; it signifies the 
acceptance into the Western club. Through the Turkish elites, the European Union has 
often been presented as the ultimate opportunity to improve the economic, social and 
political well being of the Turkish people. The masses generally accepted this argument 
and supported the EU bid until the 2002 when serious policy reforms started to be passed 
by from the parliament. The first policy package included abolishment of the death 
penalty and this created a strong reaction by the public. After that point, public support 
started to decrease.246 
In Turkey, more educated, less religious, more leftist parts of the population are 
supportive of EU membership; as Ozgehan Senyuva explains, “the potential winners of 
transition are more supportive.” 247  The biggest support, however, comes from the 
business elite who are also another potential winner of this membership.  
The Turkish business elite is very influential in the formation of public opinion 
toward the European Union, and in this process, the major actor is the Turkish Industry 
and Business Association (TUSIAD). TUSIAD, as a non-governmental organization, is 
not just a business association but also an organization that aims to be the opinion leader 
of the society. In its statute, TUSIAD describes its mission as to contribute to the creation 
of a modern Turkey with Western values such as the rule of law and human rights. In 
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order to realize this aim, TUSIAD sees the European Union as a very important step. 
Again in its statute, it is written that one of the main missions of TUSIAD is to contribute 
to the promotion of Turkey’s European Union membership in both Turkey and in the 
international arena. 248  TUSIAD has had a 
representative office in the United States, 
TUSIAD-US, which aims to strengthen not only economic but also political ties between 
Turkey and the United States.249 On 17 June 2010, TUSIAD-US met with Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton, and asked for US support 
of Turkish policies, especially EU 
membership. 250  With the leadership of 
TUSIAD, the Turkish business circles expect 
the increasing support of the United States for 
the Turkish Westernization process. 
On the other hand, general Turkish public opinion about membership has been 
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 Two of the three publics surveyed in the Middle East also offer critical views of Russia. 
Majorities in Jordan (58%) and Egypt (58%) currently voice a negative assessment of Russia. 
Just one year earlier, Egyptian attitudes were nearly evenly divided. In contrast, 55% of 
Lebanese express positive views of Russia. 
 
 Negative views of Russia tend to predominate in Asia. A majority of Japanese (60%) 
express unfavorable views of Russia, although that figure is down from 68% in 2009. In 
Indonesia, 44% voice negative opinions of Russia. Similarly, 45% of South Koreans are critical 
of Russia, up from 35% the previous year. In contrast, half of Indians (51%) and a plurality of 
Chinese (49%) hold a positive opinion of Russia.  
 
 In Africa, favorable views of Russia outnumber negative ones. A majority of Nigerians 
(53%) hold a positive opinion of Russia. Similarly, in Kenya 47% express a positive view, up 
from 35% the previous year. 
 
Views of the European Union  
Views of the European Union have changed little 
in the last year, at least among the EU member states 
surveyed. Elsewhere, the EU’s popularity has also 
remained steady or grown. Majorities or pluralities in 17 
of the 22 countries surveyed have a favorable view of the 
EU. However, majorities in Jordan (67%), Turkey (57%) 
and Egypt (55%) express a negative view of the EU.  
 
Support for the Brussels-based institution is 
widespread among the five EU member countries 
included in the survey. Overwhelming majorities in 
Poland (81%) and Spain (77%) express favorable 
opinions of the EU. More than six-in-ten hold the same 
view in France (64%) and Germany (62%). Given past 
trends, it is not surprising that British enthusiasm for the 
EU is more muted; only 49% voice a positive opinion. 
British favorability ratings of the EU have hovered 
around 50% since 2004.  
 
A large majority of Russians (69%) hold 
favorable views of the EU. In Asia, enthusiasm for the 
EU is widespread and has improved since last year. 
Majorities in South Korea (75%), Japan (73%) and 
Pew Research Center Q7f.
18
37
35
42
14
15
57
38
55
67
14
16
39
45
27
22
20
12
19
57
64
62
81
69
28
61
42
29
58
47
36
8
55
50
42
80
67
20
28
38
77
49
75
73
U.S.
Spain
France
 Germany
Britain
Poland
Russia
Turkey
Lebanon
Egypt
Jordan
S. Korea
Japan
Indonesia
China
India
Pakistan
Brazil
Argentina
Mexico
Kenya
Nigeria
Unfavorable Favorable
`
Views of the European UnionChart 7.2: Views of Turkish People  
Source: Pew, 2010  
Chart 7.1: Turkish Opinion on becoming 
EU member 
Source: Pew, 2010 
Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project – www.pewglobal.org 
 
 19
 In no European country surveyed does a 
majority think the U.S. takes their interests into 
account. Between 2007 and 2009, the British, 
French and German publics became much more 
likely to believe the U.S. considers their 
interests. However, this view has become 
slightly less common in all three nations over 
the last year. The share of the public who think 
the U.S. considers their interests has dropped 
eight percentage points in Britain, seven in 
Germany, and five in France. 
 
 There are five countries where fewer 
than 20% believe the U.S. considers their 
interest: Pakistan (19%), Lebanon (19%), 
Argentina (16%), Egypt (15%) and Turkey 
(9%). This single-digit number in Turkey is 
down six percentage points since last year, and 
is as low as it was in 2003, shortly after the start 
of the Iraq war. 
 
 Americans tend to see this issue quite 
differently from much of the rest of the world. 
When asked how much their country takes into 
account the interests of other countries around 
the world, 76% of Americans say a great deal or 
a fair amount. This is little changed from last 
year, but is significantly higher than in 2007, 
when 59% of Americans expressed this opinion. 
 
Views of U.S. Anti-Terror Efforts 
 Majorities in 12 of the 22 countries surveyed say they favor U.S.-led efforts to fight 
terrorism, including all four Western European countries. Support for American anti-terrorism 
efforts rose substantially in Western Europe between 2007 and 2009, and it remains high in this 
year’s poll, although support has declined a bit in Britain, France and Germany.  
 
 A similar pattern can be seen in India and China, where support for the U.S.-led anti-
terrorism campaign increased sharply between 2007 and 2009, but has fallen significantly in the 
last year, dropping 17 percentage points in India and nine points in China. 
How Much Does the U.S. Consider  
Your Country’s Interests? 
 
  % Great deal/Fair amount 
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2007 2009 2010 
 % % % % % % % 
U.S.* 75 73 70 67 59 79 76 
 
Britain 44 44 36 32 24 43 35 
France 21 14 14 18 11 34 29 
Germany 52 32 29 38 27 54 47 
Spain -- 22 -- 19 17 19 20 
 
Poland 29 -- -- 13 31 34 38 
Russia 21 22 20 21 19 31 30 
 
Turkey 17 9 14 13 14 15 9 
 
Egypt -- -- -- -- 24 20 15 
 
Jordan 28 19 16 17 23 16 26 
Lebanon 20 18 -- 35 34 21 19 
 
China -- -- -- 52 44 62 76 
India 51 -- -- 63 69 81 83 
 
Indonesia 41 25 -- 59 45 44 50 
Japan 35 -- -- -- 35 36 31 
Pakistan 23 23 18 39 21 22 19 
S. Korea 23 21 -- -- 16 35 32 
 
Argentina 16 -- -- -- 21 18 16 
 
Brazil -- -- -- -- -- -- 56 
Mexico 42 -- -- -- 47 48 33 
 
Kenya 53 -- -- -- 67 74 75 
Nigeria 75 57 -- -- 65 66 66 
 
“In making international policy decisions, to what extent 
do you think the United States takes into account the 
interests of countries like (survey country) – a great deal, 
a fair amount, not too much, or not at all?” (Pew 
Research Center Q37) 
 
*In the U.S. the question asks: “In making international 
policy decisions, to what extent do you think the United 
States takes into account the interests of other countries 
around the world – a great deal, a fair amount, not too 
much, or not at all?” (Pew Research Center Q37US) 
 
Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project – www.pewglobal.org 
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changing (See chart 7.1) The 2010 Pew Global Attitudes report shows that the support of 
the Turkish public for membership decreased 14 percent in five years. Moreover, only 28 
percent of Turks hold a positive view of the EU according to the same report (see chart 
7.2). In this respect it is hard to say that the Turkish public supports US support FOR 
Turkey’s EU bid.  In the 2010 Pew report, it is only 9 percent of the Turkish public (the 
lowest rate in the whole world) believes that the United States considers Turkey’s 
interests in its foreign policy making. Thus, even though the United States officially 
supports the Turkey’s membership bid, Turkish public does not have high expectations 
from it. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
Turkey and the United States have had a long history of relations that have been 
generally friendly and cooperative since the 1946 Truman Doctrine was enunciated in the 
United States. Although there have been some fluctuations, both sides worked for the 
continuation of good relations. During the Cold War years, their relationship evolved into 
a “strategic partnership” which has continued also after the Cold War. In Turkish-
American relations, public opinion has had a strong impact on the policy-making process.  
This study has hypothesized that because of the size and diversity of the United 
States, public opinion generally impacts the decision-makers through the returns of the 
elite. On the other hand, in the more cohesive, homogenous Turkey, mass opinion is more 
important. In two of the cases analyzed, the Cyprus Problem and the Armenian Question, 
the Turkish public has indeed held strong opinions. Since the elites and leaders have 
shared this nationalism, it is not really that the masses have been influential so much as 
the fact that they have lent support to the leadership. In the other case, Turkey’s accession 
to the European Union, it turn out that elite opinion and leadership preferences have been 
more important than mass opinion. Therefore the picture is mixed in terms of my 
hypotheses. In all three cases, the fact that attitudes are shared between the masses and 
the leaders makes the measurement of the public’s actual influence difficult. Also, in the 
academic sphere, there is a considerable lack of empirical studies investigating the 
interaction between the Turkish political elite, policy-makers and the Turkish public.251 
In the case of the United States, there is a very diverse population composed of 
                                                
251 Ozgehan Senyuva (2006) “Turkish Public Opinion and European Union Membership: the State of the 
Art in Public Opinion Studies in Turkey” Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs, Center for 
Strategic Research, Vol. 6, Spring 2006, p.20 
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many different people from various national, ethnic and religious backgrounds. The size 
and diversity of the population make it harder for the public to know every issue in which 
a subgroup of people has an interest. Thus, there is a need for the elites (generally lobby 
groups) to construct public opinion and direct it to the decision makers. Thus, the elites 
play an important role in the flow of public opinion to the decision-makers. In sum, in the 
case of the United States, the elites are very important in the construction and the 
mobilization of public opinion. In the three cases analyzed, lobbies have been influential 
in helping US decision makers to create.   
 Where do we go from here? Although from the three cases, the Cyprus Problem, 
the Armenian Question and Turkey’s accession into the European Union, it can be 
concluded that public is effective in both Turkey and the United States, in reality the 
impact of the public opinion is more limited than it appears and very hard to measure 
unless it is clearly organized.  
In the Turkish case, there is a need for elite influence to balance collective 
nationalist reactions, so that a relatively more rational public opinion can be constructed. 
Writers, opinion leaders and businessmen must work to inform the masses about critical 
foreign policy issues so that public opinion is less reactive and more proactive. Thus, the 
politicians can be more free to solve the problems without the fear of wide nationalistic 
reactions.  
In the United States, it is understandable that the public can not be informed about 
all foreign policy issues in which subgroups have a special interest so the lobby groups 
need to work more effectively to introduce their causes to the masses. Considering that 
the lobbies differ in size and power, however it is difficult to ensure equitable decision-
 96 
making. For example, the pressure the Greek and the Armenian lobbies can bring to bear 
on Congress is stronger than what the Turkish lobby can do as a “latecomer” to 
Washington circles. The Turkish lobby clearly needs to increase its influence on the 
policy-makers in order to be equally heard by the US policy-makers.  
To sum up, public opinion is a very important determinant of the policy-making 
process today, and especially given the spread of democracies throughout the world. As 
can be seen in the Middle East (at the time of writing), governments ignore public 
opinion, especially mass opinion, at their peril. While policy makers do not need to 
beholden to polls and surveys, they must, at the same time, listen to the voice of the 
people whose vote it is to elect them to their offices. 
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